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Several investigators (Markman 1996; Waxman and Kosowski 1990; Waxman 1994)
have proposed that children look for object names first. Their studies reveal that more
than 50% o f children’s first 50 words are object names. 1 disagree with this thesis. 1
claim that there is no predictable pattern to very early vocabularies. The patterns seen in
vocabularies o f 50 words cannot be extrapolated to children’s very first words. Children
may not initially be looking for object names at aU when they begin to produce their first
words. They are not initially matching meaning to sound: that is, the sounds they
produce are not symbolic words. Rather, children begin talking by repeating fi-equently
heard sounds that are emotionally salient and are socially reinforced. What is salient to
one child is not to another. Hence, children’s early vocabularies will be highly
individualistic. Children may appear to attach a referential meaning to these first words
because they say them in the correct context, but these first words are the result o f social
interaction and reinforcement. In a very short time period, certainly by the time they
produce 50 words, the sounds can become symbolic representations —true words. This
idea has support in the literature (Aslin et al. 1999; Bates et al. 1984; Gopnik et al. 1995;
Gopnik 1981). However, there is other research (Bates et al. 1979; Snow 1981, 1999;
Hirsh-Pasek et al. 1999) that suggests a diSerent explanation for early word production
than an innate search for object names. A study was undertaken o f the early vocabularies
o f 46 infants, primarily in the 5-word to 25-word vocabulary range. Statistical analysis
demonstrates that the percentage o f words appearing in word categories (such as “noun”)
is highly variable and cannot be predicted. Results do not support an innate search for
object names in initial word production. Further, early vocabularies can best be
described as transitional. A statistically significant increase in the percentage o f nouns
and a decrease in the percentage o f words with social or emotional content were found as
vocabulary size increased.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.0 What a Language Acquisition Theory Must Provide
The focus of this thesis is how children begin to use words and what those first
utterances might mean to them. Most theories of language acquisition have focused on
the acquisition o f syntax, but language is not possible without words. In order to
understand how children identify part o f the noise around them as linguistically
significant and come to be language users themselves, one must include a study of the
beginnings o f word production. Any theory about language acquisition should include an
explanation o f how children come to produce their first words because the way language
begins is related to cognitive development and can affect how it develops into a grammar.
An explanation of language learning, then, must describe what words are and how the
child understands them. Is the child actively looking for words? Does reinforcement
play a role in the storage and production o f words? Are first words linked to innate
concepts?

What is it that children have learned when we say they have learned words?

What motivation exists to get the process started? This paper will look for meaningful
answers to these questions, focusing on the nature and source of children’s early word
production.
1.1 Do Children Actively Search for and Attach Meaning to Early Words?
Nativist theories hold that certain fundamental aspects of knowledge are innate.
Experience provides triggers to fill in preformed or latent categories. Grammar is treated
as an organ in the brain much like other organs in the body. It is said to unfold on a
1

maturational schedule that is governed by genetics. Even in a nativist theory, however,
there must be a starting point in the language acquisition process. Some researchers
(Markman 1996; Waxman et al. 1990; Waxman 1994) have proposed that children come
to language learning with an innate expectation that words will be object names. If this is
true, then children’s first words must represent a pre-existing linkage between categories
of objects and nouns. This supposes that the child matches concepts to words and that this
ability, as weU as the innate concepts, are both part of the child’s innate endowment.
Other researchers argue that children do not start with innate concepts. They
argue that not all early words are nouns and that children are not predisposed to look for
object labels (Aslin et al. 1999; Bates et al. 1984; Gopnik et al. 1995; Gopnik et al. 1986;
Gopnik 1981). Their conclusion has been that linguistic development is grounded in
specific types of general cognitive development. Children begin by saying words and
this production o f words helps concepts develop. This idea has been reinforced by the
use o f computer simulations showing that certain kinds o f these models seem to mimic
the gradual acquisition of both word meaning and grammar that has been observed in
children (Elman 1999; Plunkett 1995). Termed “emergentist,” this view holds that
children don’t actively search for words but rather that word meanings gradually emerge.
Through a series o f experiments with young children, Vygotsky (in Rieber et al.
1987) showed that children appear to talk to themselves only after they begin to converse
with others. He believed this was evidence that children are first of all social. They
develop reflective thinking only after they engage in social interaction. Vygotsky
showed that, while adults and children use the same words to refer to the same thing,
children sort objects differently than adults and in different ways at different ages. For
7

example, very young children perform a sorting task by putting objects into piles with no
ordering principle at all. They progress to sorting by some connection between objects
but may use any connection at all and sometimes even change what associations they use
from one object to the next during the sorting task. He interpreted this to mean that
developing or primitive concepts are better described as complexes o f features that do not
become real concepts until later stages. If Vygotsky is correct, early speech is primarily
used for social purposes and the concepts behind early words are not representative o f
innate concepts since those concepts do not exist until much later in life.
Vygotsky did not think the ideas behind early concepts or complexes, as he called
them, were innate because early sorting indicated that any resemblance between objects
might be used to associate thenL If this is true, then perhaps words themselves are stored
differently in a child’s brain than in an adult’s and with different kinds of
interconnections. There is recent evidence that this is physically the case. Neville et al.
(1992) studied event-related potentials (ERP) in the brain and report that elicitation of
words from different semantic classes results in different electrical activity. McDonald
( 1997) reports that function words are processed in different parts o f the brain depending
on the age o f the child. Young children reportedly process both function words and
content words bilaterally, while adults process function words largely in the lefthemisphere anterior temporal regions where processing is more rapid. This process
gradually changes as the child grows older, not reaching adult levels until the child is
around 15 or 16 years old. Such neurological studies support Vygotsky’s conclusion that
words are processed differently in the brains of young children than in the brains o f older
children and adults. While not proof that o f changing conceptual development, this
3

evidence is suggestive of the kinds of changes in processing that has been demonstrated
in children’s behavior.
1.2 What Motivates Children to Produce First Words?
What is it about language that children find so interesting? Why are they so eager
to participate in the process? Proof that humans are physically capable o f speaking does
not explain why they do so. A computer program may be shown to be capable of
learning grammar but it seems intuitive that this does not explain the acquisition of
language by children because children are not machines that always cooperate with the
programmer. Artificial neural networks might be able to mimic word learning, but the
programs leam words because the programmer designs the program to do so. If nature
has so obviously endowed humans with the ability to acquire language, there should be
some reason for it. Is the desire to speak the result of an instinct, a language module in
the brain, or a non-linguistic social capacity designed for survival? I suggest that
children are not innately predisposed to link certain kinds o f words to innately defined
categories but rather that the desire to speak is primarily social, which provides the
motivation for children to leam to communicate with words.
The problems o f how children link meaning to form and what motivates them to
begin to speak are difficult to answer. There is a lack o f consensus even among people
who otherwise generally agree with each other. I believe a multi-disciplinary approach,
incorporating background fi’om psychology and anthropology as well as linguistic, may
provide answers that have eluded other approaches. This paper examines what theorists
currently propose as mechanisms for children’s production o f earliest words. It proposes
a primarily social alternative theory suggesting that first words do not reflect an innate
4

search for object labels but are a social tool to elicit parental response. First words are
possible because o f both linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive development and an
innate desire to interact socially. Infant communication gradually changes from being
just social sounds to using sounds in a context, to sounds acquiring meaning as “events.”
Words begin to acquire real meaning when one word is paired with one context —an
indication that a word has acquired indexical meaning. That is, the word is an index to
the context in the way the doorbell indicates the presence o f a visitor. The child
discovers that a word can actually be used in a variety of situations and words begin to
acquire, first extended indexical and, finally, symbolic meanings as the child realizes that
a word actually represents a category o f objects, actions, or attributes. The process of
acquiring words can be described, then, not as an instinctive search for object labels but
as a continuum from a form of social interaction to more exclusively symbolic use of
words for communication.
Further, this paper presents a statistical analysis o f the production vocabularies of
children at various vocabulary levels and suggests that it reveals that the content o f early
vocabularies is not predictable. Several authors have investigated the vocabularies of
babies who know about 50 words. Although babies’ personalities can affect the
distribution of words in their vocabularies and there are certain universals reflecting
children’s needs, by the time a child has learned 50 words, the effects o f their culture and
language appear to be reflected in the proportions o f major word categories. BoyssonBardies (1999) observes that certain characteristics of each language affect what
categories of words predominate in children’s vocabularies. She says that cultural
attitudes influence how parents approach their children linguistically and these same
5

attitudes affect how the children respond. For instance, she says, the types o f words in
French babies’ early vocabularies tend to be words for food, clothing, and “agreeable
activities or states.” American children name the people around them and use
surprisingly few verbs and adjectives. Japanese children use more social terms such as
politeness terms and adverbs. My study of children’s first few words, however, does not
show a stable early pattern reflecting innately defined categories but instead shows that
early vocabularies are in a transition period in which words are just beginning to acquire
linguistic meaning.
Human language acquisition is immensely complex and most previous studies have
focused on small areas but not overall solutions. Providing a complex answer to the
question of how children leam words is difficult but I believe there has been sufficient
research to make it possible to address. It would be of general interest and considerable
benefit to linguistic research if this paper results in a useful consolidation of previous
research. If we understand how words are acquired, we will have a better foundation for
understanding what language is and where it came fi-om. This paper will provide
evidence that children’s first words are not the result of an innate search for object labels
but, also, it may lead to a better overall understanding o f how the process of language
acquisition begins and suggest possible directions for research.
1.3 Definitions
The items described here are concepts that are important to the current discussion
and an understanding o f them as they apply to the current topic is essential. Terminology
often contributes significantly to misunderstanding. Many of the more controversial
aspects of language acquisition are the result o f investigators defining terms in different
6

ways. A discussion o f how first words are acquired will depend on standardizing the
important terminology. The following discussion of the meanings of these terms may not
solve the problem but should provide some resolution as well as an introduction to the
difficulties involved in understanding the overall problem.
1.3.1

Innateness
O f all the concepts discussed here, innateness is probably the most controversial

and difficult to define. A simple definition is that anything that is inborn is innate. In
reality, the concept is much more complex. Knowledge you are bom with rather than
acquired fi*om learning can be called innate (Payne and Wenger 1998). This in-bom kind
o f knowledge is exactly the kind o f innateness that early Greek philosophers believed in.
Socrates believed that aU knowledge was innate. All tmth and knowledge, he claimed,
was present in the mind and only needed the proper educational environment to emerge
fully formed.
Today we try to explain the world in scientific terms. Innateness has come to
mean “something present in the genome” - something that nature has endowed us with
and that we acquired by the processes of natural selection. The problem is that genetic
effects are not usually direct but rather the result of an interaction of many genes as well
as interaction with the environment. Essentially everything about us fi-om how we grow
toes to how we leam our names is a con^lex interaction between heredity and
environment. Hence, even defining innateness in terms of genetics doesn’t provide a
clear answer.
Further confusion about innateness stems from the fact that there are different
ways to be innate. Elman (1999) outlines three levels of innateness: representational,
1

architectural, and chronotopic. Representational innateness means that the way the
synapses between neurons connect with each other is predetermined. This “hard-wired”
kind of innateness would result in children being bom with the kind of innate knowledge
that Socrates talked about. This thesis discusses the use of artificial neural networks as
models o f the brain. In a neural network, representational innateness is the equivalent to
presetting the weights between connections. In other words, the answers to certain
questions are predetermined.
Architectural innateness operates on a higher level than representational. It refers
to three kinds o f limitations on the physical structure o f the brain. First, it refers to the
types o f neurons and how they use chemicals to transfer information. Second, it refers to
the density o f cells, what kinds o f cells are present, and where they are located. Finally,
it refers to the way the various pieces o f the system are connected together. In
architectural innateness, knowledge is not innate but the overall structure of the system
determines what kinds of information can be received, what kinds of problems can be
solved, and how information will be stored (Elman 1999; Elman et al. 1996).
The third kind of innateness results firom developmental timing or chronotopic
constraints. For all living things, the timing of cell division is critical for the
development of a mature entity. In mammals, most of the important developmental
phenomena are the result o f a complex interaction of internal and external events. Small
changes in a developmental schedule may result in very large changes in outcome. In our
brains, direct genetic control o f timing means that the onset and sequencing of developing
neurons and their connections proceed according to a preset schedule. This effect has
been used as an explanation for “critical period” events. The assumption is that the
8

functions o f regions in the cortex are, early on, plastic and adaptable. Later, these regions
become specialized and lose their ability to perform anything other than their assigned
task.
There are different ways to be innate and each one is affected by complex
interactions with both internal and external environments. When linguists assert that
language is innate, they usually are referring to the representational or “hard-wired” kind
of innateness. No one denies that something about language acquisition is innate but
some researchers believe that children’s first words are linked to representationally innate
concepts. I will show there is evidence that only the timing and architecture have been
provided by our genome.
1.3.2

Sensation, Perception, and Cognition
One definition o f perception is the processes that create internal representations of

objects and events in the environment (Payne and Wenger 1998). In this view,
perception is the link between sensation and cognition. There are no clear boundaries
between these processes. Items in the environment may be sensed but must stand out
fi-om background noise in order to be perceived. They must be identified and recognized
in order to enter cognitive processes. Current theory explains the process by postulating
iconic (visual) and echoic (auditory) stores for information in the environment to be
collected. These storage areas hold information - all the information that is sensed.^
Sensed information is filtered by the central nervous system before it can be perceived.

‘ These areas have been shown to hold much more than a person ever becomes consciously aware of but
they contain that information for a very short time - on the order of a quarter of a second for visual and up
to four seconds for auditory stores (Payne and Wenger 1998).

What a person consciously hears and cognitively processes depends on surrounding
background noise, distractions, expectations, the actual acoustic properties of the sound,
and the content of the sound. Once perceived, cognitive processes change, store, recover
and use information. Imagery, recall, problem solving, and thinking are all terms that
apply to cognition. When we process language, the brain must use cognitive processes to
attend to several images or ideas at the same time and be able to associate between them
(Deacon 1997).
Put another way, sensation depends on “bottom-up” or “data-driven” processes
(Payne and Wenger 1998). The data are in the environment. The task is to collect
information about them. Cognition depends on “top-down” or “conceptually-driven”
processes in which the brain uses what it already knows to process the input. In between
is the process o f perception. Top-down and bottom-up processes are both used in
perception to recognize what has been seen or heard and match it to what is already
known. Language makes demands on the system at all levels of processing and infants
must begin without all the information they need initially in place. Linguistic
communication requires analysis and production o f speech sounds, the eventual
recognition o f thousands of vocabulary units, and the use o f an intricate system of
grammar rules (Deacon 1997). Because sensation, perception, and cognition are all
affected by genetics and environment and are subject to different kinds o f learning, it is
important to understand what each one is and how they are different in order to
understand how these terms apply to language acquisition Specifically, sensation is
important in language acquisition because we must be able to hear or see in order to enter
input into the process. Perception of speech sounds is necessary for the data to be
10

properly accessed. However, it is human cognition and the matching of bottom-up input
with top-down internal representations and interconnections of certain sounds or signs
that makes language possible for humans. This paper asserts that linguistic sensation and
perception are architecturally innate. Word categories that sounds may be mapped to are
not representationally innate but the structure of the system may limit what is attended to.
Early words are not mapped to innate concepts and human cognition o f word meaning
develops gradually as the result of an interaction between innate mental structure and
learning.
1.3.3

Concept
Concepts, in psychology, are mental representations that group together sets of

objects or events (Payne and Wenger 1998). When one sorts a deck o f cards with all the
hearts in one pÜe and all the clubs in another pile, we assume that the concept of suit has
been used to make the categorization. While we can observe the categorization, we
cannot observe the concept. This is why Vygotsky was able to claim that young children
do not form true concepts. He observed that very young children put things into pües in
random order. As their cognitive abilities develop, they begin to sort things but not,
according to Vygotsky’s interpretation, by using a true concept. He said that any kind of
association between objects might be used to put them into piles. He called these
associations complexes rather than concepts (Vygotsky in Rieber and Carton 1987). He
said that for children, an object is only a member of a collection. Each member is related
to at least one other member because o f its appearance or thematic relationship but may
not be related to the original member in the same way and is not based on any abstract
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idea. While it may appear that there is a concept involved, early words represent a
concrete relationship, not a symbolic mapping of objects with concepts.
In contrast to Vygotsky, other researchers believe that children begin forming
concepts in infancy. Their concepts are different from those of adults and these
differences develop gradually. Nelson (1977a,b) describes a concept-generating process
that begins in infancy. She says that a concept contains a functional core that varies from
individual to individual, whether child or adult, and which relates an object to the
individual, not by its perceptual features but by its place in his or her life experience.
Hence, both child and adult may use the same identificational features for an item, but
the functional cores may differ. Nelson’s definition of concept is that it is a collection of
features, not an image built up of those features. For example, images of birds might be
associated with the concept o f ‘birdiness’ but a single image is not the concept. An adult
concept of what a bird is includes the ability to fly and the possession of feathers
(Markowitz 1988). The child’s problem is then an ongoing one of identifying those
features that differentiate one concept from related ones. A concept is neither a concrete
and final goal nor as continuous as daüy experience but something in-between. Concepts
are strongly related to a first occurrence but modified by related episodes. While
Vygotsky identified stages o f concept development and identified early concepts as
complexes. Nelson describes the process as a continuum from early concepts with
minimal functional cores to adult concepts wdth more complex functional cores. For
Nelson, this process begins with primitive concepts in early infancy, progresses gradually
to adult concepts, and never ends.

12

Further complicating the issue of a concept is that some researchers have
suggested different levels o f concepts. Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1998) refer to a
Cartesian hierarchy o f concept levels. Each concept is dependent on pre-existing
subconcepts. For example, the concept of punishment is composed of at least the
subconcepts o f agency, intention, and responsibility. Partial or minimal concepts such as
Nelson (1977a,b) described are not allowed in this theory. If any of the subconcepts are
missing, the whole higher concept is missing. The theory also suggests discontinuities or
jumps in concept formation. In this view, higher concepts are complex, cannot be
mapped to a single object, and are not possible unless aU the lower concepts are in place.
Premack (1984) suggests that language itself may allow the development of
higher-level concepts. Certain kinds of concepts are not possible prior to the acquisition
of language. He showed that chimpanzees normally solve problems on a sensory basis.
They understand that one apple is ‘^he same as” another apple. When he used plastic
tokens to represent words and taught them some basic sentence structures, they were then
able to also match half an apple to half a glass of water illustrating that they understood
the concept, “half o f something,” Chimpanzees that were not trained to use the word
tokens failed this kind of conceptual task. Pre-linguistic sensory concepts may be lower
level kinds o f concepts or may be qualitatively different than linguistic concepts.
Further, in her investigation of category formation, Markman’s (1996) results
seem to agree with Vygotsky’s observation that older children (6 and 7 year olds) sort by
taxonomic category but younger children may sort objects by a variety of causal,
temporal, or spatial relationships. Waxman and Markman (1990), Waxman (1994), and
Smith (1996), however, found that even children as young as 2 years old will sort
13

taxonomically if given a label for one of the items to be sorted. Hence, while a number
of studies provide evidence that there that primitive concepts or complexes, as Vygotsky
termed them, may form with or without language but that there also may be something
special about language that encourages true concept formation, perhaps at a higher level.
There is considerable disagreement between researchers over what concepts
children have and when children acquire them. There are probably different kinds or
levels o f concepts and there may be a continuum between early or primitive concepts and
mature or adult concepts. Researchers disagree as to whether some concepts are
representationally innate or just acquired very early. Some kinds of linguistic concepts
appear to develop after or at the time words are learned so they are probably not innate in
the representational sense. This is important because it means it is possible that concepts
behind word meanings are not present before the words are learned. This should be
testable. If linguistic concepts were acquired only after words begin to be produced, first
words would be a reflection of environmental factors rather than innate predispositions.
1.3.4

Categories
Categorization is a cognitive process (Payne and Wenger 1998). All that is meant

by general categorization is that a set of objects or events is divided into at least two
groups. Categorizing allows us to simplify and order the world. We are able to identify
and respond to new objects and events more easily if we can associate them with
categories we already know. We can objectively observe and measure categorization
when it occurs but we can never know for sure what, if any, concepts are used to make
the categorization. Hence, any inference that an innate mapping firom concept to object
has been made is more intuitive than empirical.
14

This definition o f categories is neat and tidy but categories don’t always cooperate
in a neat and tidy fashion. For some things in the world, it is easy to identify and define a
category - no one would argue about whether or not a particular triangle belongs in the
category triangle. For most things, however, categories are fuzzier. Almost any category
in the real world will contain some items that are more typical members than other items.
A common example is the category of birds. Robins are almost always considered
typical birds but bats can be included in the category as well because they have wings and
fly (Markowitz 1988). In this sense, the members o f a category exhibit a “family
resemblance.” There is usually a continuum between what is definitely included in the
set and what is definitely outside it (Givon 1999). Further, categories are defined
differently in different cultures (Lakoff 1987). Hence, it is unlikely that word categories
could be innate.
It is important to understand what categorization is and what it isn’t.
Categorization o f sounds in the environment is important in the acquisition of words
because it allows children to separate out meaningfiil bits. Categorization is one o f a
number o f cognitive processes that humans need in order to survive because we have to
know what sorts o f things are good to eat, what are dangerous, and what in the world gets
matched up with what other things. The ability to categorize presages the development
of the awareness of cause and effect. It allows children to leam that the appearance of
one kind of thing predicts the appearance o f a related kind of thing (Payne and Wenger
1998).

15

1.3.5

Learning
Learning means that a change occurs as a consequence o f experience. At the

neural level, this refers to a change in the weighting of neural excitation (Payne and
Wenger 1998). Neurons support learning in three ways: the amount of neurotransmitter
may increase or decrease, the synapses between axons may increase or decrease, and new
synapses may form. Learning is restricted by the capacity o f memory and by time.
Learning at the neural level is enhanced and reinforced by repetition but may be lost or
inhibited by an increase in time between episodes o f exposure. This kind of learning has
been simulated in neural networks (Payne and Wenger 1998; Rumelhart and McClelland
1993; Eknan et al. 1996). Weights on connections between artificial neurons are
strengthened or weakened a small amount each time the network attempts to solve a
problem. The result is that the network gradually becomes able to solve certain kinds o f
problems. When the network is able to arrive at correct answers for the given problems,
it is said to have “learned” how to solve these problems.
At a higher level, psychologists recognize three stages in the acquisition of a
learned skill (Payne and Wenger 1998). First is the cognitive stage, a time when basic
facts are consciously memorized and rehearsed. The detailed information or what is
required to perform the task is important. Second is the associative stage, a time when
errors in performance are recognized and connections or associations are strengthened.
In the associative stage, procedural knowledge becomes important as depth o f processing
increases. That is, how the task is to be performed is more important to the learner than
what is performed. The learner is integrating the stages o f the task and connections
between the elements of the task become strengthened. Finally, the skill becomes
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mastered as a routine and automatic in the autonomous stage. Performance speeds up
and the task can be performed even when actually concentrating on something else. This
process of learning in stages applies to many kinds of skills including driving a car,
playing a piano, and touch-typing.
Language acquisition is usually considered a different kind o f learning than skill
learning. Bowerman (1993) differentiates the way that language is learned from other,
non-verbal learning by saying that languages use different criteria for classifying
referents than non-linguistic tasks. Children must leam a different level o f organization
in language learning. Although many researchers appear to equate the two, there is a
difference between language learning or acquisition and word learning. Word learning
is not equated in this paper with language learning or language acquisition. Word
learning refers to the ability of a child to produce and use a word in an appropriate
context and does not necessarily reflect linguistic understanding. Early word production
is overt evidence of learning in the sense that a change has occurred in a child’s brain.
While a learning bias may exist, an innate general attentional bias could explain the
origins and mechanisms o f initial word learning (Smith 1996). The fact that the regular
pairing o f one cue with a second cue will cause the first cue to predict the second is a
well-documented property o f general learning. Smith maintains that initial wordlearning biases are not linguistic but made out o f the same general associative and
attentional processes that are typical of other forms of skill learning.
Because some researchers claim the ability to leam language is an instinct or
develops as part of the maturational process (Pinker 1994; Chomsky 1975) it is important
to differentiate the learning o f words from learning how to leam words. The way
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children leam their first words (that is, leam to produce words) is a slow process that
beginns between nine to twelve months of age. The process picks up speed a few months
later so that by the time a child is three years old, most normal children can say several
hundred words (Bates and Goodman 1999; Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek 2000; Fenson et
al. 1994). This process of learning words seems to follow the pattern of skill acquisition.
The way that children leam words closely resembles that of classical skill learning as
described by psychologists. That is, in the beginning, children leam words very slowly
and deliberately as in the cognitive stage. Next, while errors may occur, words seem to
be analyzed while connections and associations between them become strengthened.
Finally, word acquisition becomes rapid and automatic or autonomous. The process
speeds up - children acquire vocabulary rapidly after the age of about two years. Hence,
word acquisition may be a skill that is learned rather than innately predetermined, in the
sense o f representational innateness, even though the architecture of the brain provides
the structure necessary for it to occur.
1.3.6

Gesture, Icon, Index, Symbol, Sign
Gestures can be meaningful but are not arbitrary the way words are. There is a

wide range o f innate gestures that humans produce. These are related to the calls and
gestures o f other animals. Our “gesture-call” system includes most o f our nonverbal
communication. It is unlikely that human language grew out of this system because
gestures and calls are graded. They have no grammar, cannot be broken down into
smaller parts, are usually not learned, and are pretty much the same fi-om culture to
culture regardless of language. What this means is that, while a “V” for victory is an
arbitrary symbol for something that has nothing to do with fingers, a yawn is universal
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and usually uncontrollable. A nod and a headshake are both considered meaningful,
language-like behavior but they are distinct, with no halfway point, the way there is
between a laugh and a giggle (Burling 1993). Although reference may be made to
symbolic gestures, the default meaning of the word gesture is simply a sound or
movement that does not have arbitrary meaning.
Icons are essentially pictures of things. Iconic reference is defined as a
relationship by resemblance. Iconicity is the quality of an image that causes the viewer to
recognize, or more exactly, to re-cognize that input image. A picture o f a thing and
pictograms are iconic. Iconicity generates recognition as in the way a picture or even a
caricature o f something generates the recognition o f the object portrayed (Deacon 1997).
A stimulus has iconic reference when nothing more than physical similarity is involved in
the reference. Icons have identificational features that indicate similarity but it is not
necessary that functional features be noted and a true concept of the thing is not
necessarily formed when pre-linguistic iconic reference is recognized. Iconicity forms
the foundation o f a continuum of meaning because it is the most basic way that
something can be re-presented (Deacon 1997). It is the bottom step o f the hierarchy o f
representational process and provides a basis for the development of the next step,
indexical relationship.
While iconicity is acquired through perceptual similarity, index is defined as
relationship by participation (Deacon 1997). It indicates the presence of a thing the way
that smoke indicates fire. A child may associate mother putting on her coat with mother
leaving and, hence, begin to cry. Indexical reference is a natural function of cognition.
Deacon suggests that it is dependent upon iconic reference and that indexical
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relationships are composed of iconic relationships between sets o f icons. Indexical
meanings are acquired by a perception of contiguity or correlation (Bates et al. 1979). A
word, iconically associated with other occurrences of the sound, becomes able to call to
mind an object, iconically associated with other objects in past experience. Golinkoff et
al. (1999) call words that have indexical reference “context-bound.” These words may
seem similar to symbols but are still bound to their referent. Indexes are, however, very
important in the development o f symbolic meaning, so much so that Deacon (1997) says
that symbolic meaning can only be formed after relationships between indices are
formed.
A symbol is usually defined as something that stands for or represents something
else. A word is said to be a symbol because it is an arbitrary sound that stands for a
concept. But this is what I just defined as an index. Symbolic reference differs because it
is relationship by a socially agreed-upon convention and is arbitrary and not causally
connected to a referent. Rather than just associating a word with a situation or an object,
symbolic meaning allows multiple contexts, multiple situations, and relationships with
other words. A symbol is not isolated fi*om other symbols but represents a set of
interrelated concepts rather than a relationship with concrete reality.
Deacon (1997) further explains that, while the ability to use a word in a variety o f
contexts is evidence o f symbolic understanding, this can occur with the use of indices as
well. There are two things that critically define the difference between an index and a
symbol. One is that there is a correlation in time and place between an index and its
referent. If a smoke-like smell persists in the absence of anything burning, it will lose its
relationship to fire. Symbolic reference persists regardless o f any such correlation. The
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word “smoke,” used as a symbol, retains its meaning even when used repeatedly in the
absence of smoke. Second, while indices do not affect each other, words are related to
other words. Symbols reveal linguistic knowledge because they not only map to the
physical world, they can map onto other symbols independently o f their physical
referents. Deacon uses the example of an animal trained to associate a number of
different words with different foods. Each word is associated with a particular food and
if one o f these word-object associations breaks down or is extinguished, it will have little
effect on other associations. Words as symbols, however, can map onto other words. If
one of their meanings breaks down, it affects the reference o f other words (as when the
word bad takes on the new meaning, very good).
The word sign has been used in a variety o f contexts. Sign languages are systems
of symbolic gestures and, in this sense, a sign is a symbol. There are other meanings for
the word, among them the definition that a sign suggests the presence or existence of
something not immediately evident. In this sense a sign can be an index.
Because these terms are used in many discussions about word learning, it is
important to understand what they mean. As noted above, many people define symbol
the way we have defined index. The two are easy to confuse and, while we speak of
children’s first words, what we really mean are children’s first signs. As noted above and
in the following graphic summary, signs may be either symbolic or indexical.
Summarv of Referent Definitions
Icon Index Symbol Sign-

Has one facet of meaning
Has all facets o f meaning in one situation
Has all facets o f meaning in any situation
A symbol or index
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1.3.7

Word

Whether one argues for or against the premise that words are innately linked to
categories when children begin to speak, one must have a clear notion of what a word is.
The term is used indiscriminately by virtually anyone who ever talks or writes about
language. Technically, the term word can be used in several different senses.
Orthographically, a spelling word is separated by white space from the rest o f a sentence.
A lexical word is a dictionary item, something you expect to find a separate entry for in a
dictionary. A grammatical word is the form that appears in a particular syntactic context.
When analyzed acoustically, words have no “white space” between them yet,
psychologically, we hear them separated (Finegan 1999). The first task o f an infant, then,
is to separate this continuous language stream into units. These units are usually what we
are defining as words, but may also be unanalyzed phrases. For example, such phrases as
what’s that, want to, and have to are recognized in early speech analysis as single
morphemes or meaningful units. No infant needs a definition of word to accomplish this
and everyone seems to have an intuitive feeling about what is or is not a word but no one
has a single definition that works in all cases.
Further complicating the issue is the fact that words are constructed differently in
different languages. In languages like Chinese and English, words carry relatively few
grammatical markers. In polysynthetic languages such as Greenlandic, morphemes may
be more important than words (Fortescue and Olsen 1992). In these languages, there may
be a single-morpheme stage rather than a single-word stage. It is not surprising, then,
that the age o f the production of a child’s first word is controversial partly because of a
disagreement on what constitutes a word (Darly and Wintz 1961). Darly and Wintz
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(1961) found that the average age of a normal child’s first word could be anywhere fi-om
9 to 60 months depending on how the findings were determined and how the term word
was defined. A study done by having fathers fill out a questionnaire resulted in a median
acquisition age of first word as 15.8 months. Experimental observation o f infants by
another investigator presented the mode as approximately 10 months. Mothers’
observations in another study resulted in a median age o f 9.8 months. The definition of
the term word undoubtedly caused a large portion o f the variation. Parents so eagerly
anticipate the event that any early babbling that happens to occur in the presence o f
appropriate persons, things, or actions is apt to be considered a “first word.” Darly and
Wintz (1961) advise caution in interpreting data firom parents.
On the other hand, children’s early words are not likely to sound much like their
parents’ words (Darly and Wintz 1961). It is often the case that what parents hear as
understandable and meaningful words cannot be understood by anyone else. They
developed a working definition of a word as a sound uttered with fu ll consciousness o f its
meaning and fo r the purpose o f communication. Recall jfrom the discussion o f symbols
and indices that this definition of word does not require symbolic meaning. It does,
however, depend on an observer being able to determine when it happens. Data have
actually been collected fi-om parents that seem to be consistent and match research
observation. In the course of the development of the Mac Arthur Communicative
Development Inventories, Fenson (2000) found that parental inventories compare well
with researchers’ observations. Parent reports not only correlate well with observation
but also are internally consistent. It would seem that parents and researchers agree on
when a child is first using words. These questionnaires define a produced word as a
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sound that a child can use and probably understands. The investigators report, however,
that while parents and expert observers generally agree on the definition of the term word
and reliably report the same early words for children, neither group can always teU when
a word is being used meaningfully, when it is merely a repeated sound, or when it is a
random sound that sounds like an adult word. What this means is that there is evidence
to support the use o f parents' reports to determine infants’ first words and that this same
evidence suggests that the infant’s first words may not necessarily have linguistic
meaning. In this paper, I will adjust Darly and Wintz’s (1961) definition o f a word to be
a sound that appears to have some kind of meaning and is used for communication. In
this sense, the term word will be considered equivalent to sign, which can be either a
symbol or index, as earlier defined.
1.3.8

Emergence
Early word production has been described as evidence that a change has occurred

in a child’s brain. When things change, we look for a cause. Change may occur because
something in the environment caused it or it may change because o f some internal event
or some combination of the two. An outcome is said to emerge when it arises for reasons
not obvious or predictable firom the inputs, either internal or external. Emergence is the
result of the interaction between factors. Lacking a theoretical firamework, emergence
had, until recently, been regarded as vague, even mysterious. Something new seemed to
arise out of nowhere. Anything without an explanation could be said to “emerge.”
Recently, however, emergentism has benefited fi-om advances in biology, genetics,
embryology, brain development studies, and cognitive neuroscience. Science has made
great progress toward understanding how genes interact to produce different outcomes
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and about the plasticity of the developing brain* In addition, advances have been made in
the field of computer modeling that have helped to understand mathematically how the
interaction o f many seemingly simple factors can produce unexpectedly complex results
(Elman et al. 1996).
While nativists believe that fimdamental aspects of knowledge are inborn,
empiricists hold that all knowledge originates in the environment and comes into the
brain through the senses. Emergentists do not completely reject either nativism or
empiricism* Rather, they conceive of the two older theories as incomplete and consider
emergentism a more complete account of language acquisition (MacWhinney 1999;
Bates and Goodman 1999). Simply put, knowledge of language is neither completely
determined by inborn mental states waiting only to be triggered by external experience
nor does it originate entirely in the environment. The theory predicts that early word
production is not the result o f an innate search for nouns or any other built-in word
category. Rather first words are produced as a result o f a complex interaction between a
species-specific innate architecture and environmentally determined constraints. I
suggest in this thesis, that there is something else missing, an innate social predisposition
for communication, that all o f these theories have overlooked and that is necessary to
provide children scafiblding for words to be produced.
1.3.9

Artificial neural network
Much of the foundation for emergentism is based on the development of a type of

computer simulation called an artificial neural network. This section will define this
class o f computer programs briefly. A more detailed account of how artificial neural
networks function can be found in Appendix I.
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Advances in neuroscience and mathematics in the 1940’s allowed mathematicians
to propose a theoretical model of the way neurons function. The foxmdations of the
artificial neural network models were laid down at that time with theoretical models
designed on paper or hard-wired into circuits. Computer programmers were unable to
fully implement these ideas until high-speed, large-storage computers became readüy
available in the 1980’s. The goal was to model the brain and use the model to test
theories about how the brain worked, including how children leam words,
A mathematical function is a formula that models outcomes by making simple
calculations based on the input. Artificial neural networks model changes to the brain’s
neuronal connections by making a large number of such calculations and adjustments
based on comparisons of approximate output to expected output. An assumption is made
that a child’s brain also makes many comparisons to both internal and external expected
output. The models also assume that, like modem computers, our brains can process
information extremely rapidly and don’t care about how much storage space is required
or how many computations are required. The idea is just to get the right answer.
Confusion can arise because o f the many different terms associated with and used
for these models. Technically a neural network is a biological entity - the
interconnections o f neurons in our brains. Hence, artificial neural network (ANN) is the
correct name of the model. However, the terms neural network and neural net are often
used to refer to these computer models. In addition, each programmer seems to have a
slightly different definition o f what an artificial neural network is, depending on what
aspect o f the process is emphasized. In general, however, an ANN may be understood to
be a collection o f small processors called units or nodes, each having a small amount of
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memory. Each node is connected to other nodes by some kind o f communication channel
carrying data. The nodes operate only on their local data and on the inputs they receive
from the connections. How the nodes are connected, what data they receive, and how
they are affected by that data define the kind o f artificial neural network a model will be,
what kinds o f problems it can solve, and what kind of answers it will produce. It is
important to remember that an artificial neural network is artificial. It is not a copy of
our brains, the neurons do not work exactly like biological neurons, and the network
cannot self-start —it is not conscious in the sense that a human brain is conscious. We
currently have no computer programs that exhibit the qualities o f a mind. A
computerized neural network is capable o f simulating only a single task (Jones 1999).
ANN’S have been used to model many individual processes related to language
learning. Specifically, they appear to be able to imitate children’s learning to produce
words (Plunkett 1995; Bates et al. 1995). These computer models provide evidence that
meaning-form linkages do not have to be hard-wired into a system for word production to
begin.
1.3.10 Summary of Definitions
The terms discussed in this section were selected because they are used
commonly in linguistic discussions, will be used often in this paper, and are commonly
misunderstood. Where different people define their terms differently, arguments have no
common foimdation. Much o f the conflict in the field o f language acquisition arises from
a misunderstanding o f basic terminology. We need to understand the difference between
sensation, perception, and concept because, while they represent a continuum, only a
concept can become divorced from reality. Similarly, icons, indexes, and symbols
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represent a continuum o f abstraction. It is important to understand what a word is and
that it is not the same as a symbol but, when paired with a concept^ it can become
symbolic, separated from reality, able to support and reinforce other concepts and be
supported and reinforced by them. Specifically, when we say that a child has learned to
produce a first word, it may not mean that the child has an adult’s kind o f concept behind
that word or even that the word is being used as a symbol. These are ideas that are not
often specified but appear to have been generally taken for granted in discussions about
child language acquisition. I have tried to define them here so that the following
discussion will be clear and provide a logical and consistent basis for the comparison of
theories.
1.4 Historical Background
Theories about how children acquire language have been with us for a very long
time. The Greek philosopher Socrates believed that language was present in the mind
and only needed the proper educational environment to appear fully formed (Payne and
Wenger 1998). Seventeenth century “associationists,” thought that knowledge of the
world is acquired through experience and stored as associations. Late nineteenth and
early twentieth century behavioral psychologists argued that a child is bom vrithout any
knowledge at all and must be taught words, one at a time. Behaviorists focused on
learning acquired by reinforcement principles. In 1957, B.F. Skinner published Verbal
Behavior, a book that attempted to explain language acquisition by children as a stimuli
and response process.
Two years later, Noam Chomsky published a critique of Skinner’s theory, arguing
that if a child is to construct a grammar on the basis of observation of sentences and
28

nonsentences provided by the verbal community in the way that Skinner proposed, then
that child must be capable of constructing an extremely complex mechanism with the
properties of an abstract deductive theory. He pointed out the difficulties in Skinner’s
description o f language acquisition and effectively put to rest not just Skinner’s theory
but all similar theories by showing that behaviorist accounts generally fail to explain
language acquisition and use (Payne and Wenger 1998; Chomsky in Allen and Van
Baren 1971; Chomsky 1959). While Skinner had portrayed the child as a passive
imitator, Chomsky emphasized the learner’s active participation (Bowerman 1973). In
arguing against Skinner’s theories of acquisition, one o f Chomsky’s main achievements
was to point out the difficulties involved in explaining child language acquisition.
Chomsky (1959) observed that children seem to acquire complex grammars remarkably
quickly and easily and suggested human brains are somehow specially designed to do
this.
Those who agreed with Chomsky’s proposal that children have a built-in way of
approaching language acquisition, as well as those who did not, have continued to try to
explain how children acquire their first words. In recent years, dramatic advances in a
diverse array of disciplines have made it possible to produce and test theories of language
acquisition in ways that have not previously been possible (Elman et al. 1996; HirshPasek and Golinkoff 1996), Advances in computer technology and programming have
produced artificial neural networks that simulate some kinds o f word learning and can
demonstrate how word production may emerge in a system without being
preprogrammed with representationally innate knowledge (Ehnan 1999; Elman et al.
1996). The history o f explanations for how words are first learned has swung back and
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forth between exclusively internal and exclusively external sources. This paper seeks to
describe the process as a complex interaction between innate brain architecture, social
precocity, and environmental forces.
1.5 The Developmental Sequence
Children’s first words are not spoken in a vacuum. They are spoken only after
months of physical and mental development. Therefore, I include a brief summary of
language-related and physical events that happen during the time leading up to and
including early word production. Certainly, newborn infants do not say any words but
two-year-olds normally do. What happens in between is important both to language and
physical growth. In addition, such a description is necessary because any theory of chüd
language acquisition must actually match what children do when they begin to talk.
While the information presented in this section represents averages, there is
actually great variation among the patterns of how children leam to speak (de BoyssonBardies 1999; de Boysson-Bardies and Vihman unpublished paper; Fenson et al. 1994;
Owens 1984). Most research has worked with averages across children, even treating
children as all being the same. Some studies have been done on only a few children or
even on just one child. One o f the most famous child behaviorists, Jean Piaget,
developed his theories about the cognitive development o f children based on his diaries
of his own children (Payne and Wenger 1998; Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek 2000). At the
other extreme, results of studies done on large numbers of children present the smooth
curves o f averaged data (Darley and Winitz 1961). Both methods fail to provide an
accurate picture of the great variability between children. It is important to recognize this
variability for several reasons. If we ignore variability, the interaction between social and
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cultural experience and innate abilities cannot be fully appreciated. The variability of
language acquisition implies a plasticity of language systems that is not evident in
averaged data. Further, the fact that all children do acquire native competence of their
own language despite differences in environment and personality must be explained.
With these caveats, the following summary of what may normally be expected to occur
during the time when children are acquiring their first words is presented.
1.5.1

Newborns
Infants are surprisingly sensitive to speech sounds. Even before birth, fetuses

respond differently to the sound o f their mother’s voice than to other sounds or even
other voices (Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek 2000). At birth, infants prefer human speech to
other kinds o f sounds and can distinguish their mother’s voice fi-om other female voices
(De Boysson-Bardies 1999). Clever researchers (Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek 2000; De
Boysson-Bardies 1999; Jannedy et al. 1994) have shown that very young infants can tell
the difference between different speech sounds by studying how fast they suck on an
electronic pacifier. These studies show that infants as young as 3 or 4 days old can
distinguish almost all the phonetic contrasts found across natural languages. Even very
young infants respond to human speech differently than other kinds of sounds. They
respond especially well to their mothers and appear to enjoy and seek human attention.
1.5.2

Two to Five Months
Between two and five months, the infant’s vocal tract bends, the tongue changes

shape, and the larynx lowers (Deacon 1997; De Boysson-Bardies 1999; Lieberman
1999). These changes allow vocalization to occur in the form of sounds issuing fi-om the
larynx and soft palate. Only toward the end of this period is an infant able to modulate
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the voice voluntarily. Infants laugh and they change the duration, pitch, and intensity of
their vocal productions. They appear to delight in their own voices and are responsive to
and recognize adults’ voices. Infants watch and copy what adults do with their mouths
and also try to copy sounds (Gohnkofif and Hirsh-Pasek 2000). By four or five months,
infants begin to pick out repeated sequences of sounds and can recognize their own
names, even in the midst o f a speech stream (Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek 2000).
1.5.3

Six to Eight Months
Between six and eight months, a baby’s cooing and babbling begins to sound

more and more like language (Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek 2000). Babbling (reduplicated
consonant-vowel syllable productions) appears to be practice in saying syllables with the
consonants, vowels, and intonation patterns of the language being learned. The early
ability to distinguish a wide variety of phonemes disappears by ten to twelve-months.
For instance, infants learning English can distinguish between /k’i/ and /q’i/ of Salish at
six months but cannot hear the differences between these non-native consonants by
twelve months (de Boysson-Bardies 1999).
1.5.4

Nine to Twelve Months
After nine months, babbling becomes non-reduplicated with varied consonants

and vowels. Babbling sounds more and more like words (Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek
2000; James 1990). At around nine or ten months, many infants begin to use certain
sounds in certain contexts such as using N for approval and /u/ for disapproval (James
1990). Infants become increasingly socially aware and leam that their actions can have
an effect on people around them (Mervis 1987). They realize they have a power to affect
the behaviors o f others and will perform acts and wait for a response. They communicate
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in the form o f grunts, whines, points, and body language such as arm waving,
vocalization, and eye contact and they expect adults to respond. They will persist in the
attempt to communicate even when the adult does not seem to understand. They have
learned how to use adults as tools to get what they want (Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek
2000). They love playing games that attract attention and one of those games includes
imitating sounds.
Toward the end o f the first year, games, routines, and other social activities may
be accompanied by a high rate of meaningful signaling, pantomimes, and intonational
vocalizations. The infant directs acts towards individuals, waits for a response, and is
clearly trying to interact Avith caregivers (Mervis 1987). Some sounds in the infant’s
babbling are interpreted as first words. These early words can be identified as part of the
social routine, not necessarily linked to innate categories or meanings.
1.5.5

Twelve to Fifteen Months
Children normally enter their second year able to produce what their parents have

identified as their first word or even several words. It is difficult to identify the moment
when the child has productive command o f a “first” word. First words are not acquired
quickly and easily but are learned and produced one at a time. Fenson et al. (1994) found
that vocabulary size increases fi-om an average o f fewer than ten words at twelve months
to over forty words at sixteen months. This amounts to an acquisition rate of fewer than
two words per week and is certainly even slower in the beginning. Enormous variation in
vocabulary size characterizes children at this age. In fact, several researchers have
reported that variability between children actually increases between twelve and fifteen
months (de Boysson-Bardies 1999; Fenson et al. 1994; Bates and Goodman 1999).
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Normal children may speak anywhere from zero to frfty words at one year of age and
anywhere from fewer than ten words to over 150 words at fifteen months. By the middle
of their second year many children have already experienced what many call a “word
spurt” (Fenson et al. 1994). This acceleration occurs at some point between fifty and one
hundred words when, in the following four months, children leam an average of a word a
day (de Boysson-Bardies 1999). This change in rate of word learning suggests that there
is a quahtative difference between the early stages of the process and later language
acquisition, when words are learned rapidly. This paper proposes that a qualitative
difference, in fact, does exist and that a child’s early words are not linked to innate word
categories but that the later rapid word learning reflects that children must, by that point,
have discovered language.
Children from twelve to fifteen months o f age appear to comprehend many more
words than they can produce (Fenson et al. 1994). However, comprehension and
production may be dissociated to a high degree in early language acquisition. In fact, the
two processes are statistically separable at the time children begin to produce words
(Bates et al. 1988). Comprehension o f a word is not sufficient for production to occur
and does not necessarily mean that an apparently comprehended word has any referential
meaning for the child (Bates and Goodman 1999; Fenson et al. 1994). For instance.
Grieve and Hoogenraad (1986) noted that a 10-month-old girl was said, by her mother, to
understand the word no and stopped doing something when her mother said no.
However, she also stopped doing it when her mother said yes in the same tone of voice.
Comprehension in this type of circumstance serves to emphasize the importance of social
context in the word learning process.
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1.5.6

Summary o f Chronology
Table 1.1 presents a summary time-line of the acquisition of language skills. For

comparison, this summary includes brief descriptions of motor skills that are normally
present at about the same time. This table represents averages. AH normal infants
develop language but there is a great deal o f variability between them that is not reflected
in this table. The cultures and languages present in the child’s environment differ greatly
from one society to another. While most children successfully acquire their native
language by the age o f six, the age at which the first words are spoken, the number of
words produced by a given age, and the character o f early vocabularies vary from child to
child and also from culture to culture (de Boysson-Bardies 1999). This high degree of
variability is exactly what would be predicted by a theory that expects children to
approach language in a social way rather than search for object labels. In fact, although
there seem to be language-specific characteristic proportions of semantic categories in
children’s vocabularies as they approach 50 words (de Boysson-Bardies 1999), I contend
that a study of very early vocabularies wiU reveal that first words are essentially random
and reflect what is socially or emotionally salient to the child. In the next chapter, I will
discuss current theories that have a bearing on the question o f what first words are, how
these theories approach word learning, and what they have to say about a child’s first
words.
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Table 1 .1 - Summary of average motor and language development - before birth to 15 months.
(Compilation of data from Jannedy et al. 1994; Owens 1984; de Boysson-Bardies 1999; Werker et al. 1996)
Age
Motor Skills
Language Skills
Before
Reflexive movement
Reacts to voice. Recognizes changes in
birth
sounds. Prefers mother’s voice.
1 month
Reflexive movement of limbs, lifts head while
Responds to human voice, cries for
on stomach, coordinated eye movement, no
assistance, cooing. Categorical
reaching.
discrimination between sounds. Prefers
mother’s voice and stories read
prenatally.
2 months
Moves arms in circle, swipes at objects, raises
Distinguishes different sounds, guttural
head while sitting but head bobs.
cooing
3 months
Supports head when in prone position, weight is One-syllable cooing, vocal response to
on elbows, hands open, no grasp reflex.
speech of others, vowels predominate.
4 months
Grasps rattle, head self-supported, brings
Babbles strings of consonants. Pitch,
objects to mouth.
duration, intensity variations.
5 months
Sits supported, rolls from stomach to back, can
Vocalizes to toys, vowel-like sounds
be pulled up to stand, swaps objects from hand
interspersed with consonants, responds
to hand.
to name, smiles and vocalizes to mirror.
6 months
Turns head freely, sits straight in chair, balances Varies volume, pitch, and rate, vocalizes
pleasure, cooing resembles one-syllable
well, reaches with one hand, creeps.
utterances. Decline in discrimination of
non-native vowels. Prefers native
language prosody.
Vocal play, several sounds produced in
7 months
Pushes up on hands and knees, rocks.
one breath, listens to others.
Reduplication of sounds, intonation
Stands holding on, thumb-finger apposition,
8 months
patterns
of native language, may appear
manipulates objects, crawls.
to understand some words.
Imitates coughs, hisses, clicks, and
Stands alone briefly, gets down alone, sits
9 months
social gestures.
unsupported, explores with finger.
Obeys some commands, imitates adult
10 months Pulls to sitting position, crawls with bilateral
speech without success. No longer able
opposition, holds and drinks from cup.
to discriminate non-native vowels or
consonants.
Imitates inflections, rhythms, and facial
Stands alone, climbs up stairs, feeds self.
11 months
expressions. Expressive, word-like
babbling.
Pushes to stand from squat, climbs down stairs, Follows simple motor instructions,
12 months
reacts to ‘no’, may speak one or more
uses cup, spoon, pencil, releases object
words.
willfully, takes first steps.
Points to named objects, has 4 to 6 word
Unceasing activity, walks a few steps
15 months
backwards and sideways, carries objects in both vocabulary.
hands, throws ball, takes off shoes and socks,
scribbles.
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Chapter 2
Current Theories of Child Language Acquisition

2.0 Introduction
One theory o f language acquisition is that because children have a speciesspecific language “module” or “organ” in the brain, they are predisposed to look for the
names o f whole objects when they begin language (Waxman 1994; Markman 1993;
Waxman and Kosowski 1990). The purpose o f this thesis is to examine this theory and
compare it to those o f other researchers to understand why such an idea has been
proposed, to give evidence it is not correct, and to suggest an alternative hypothesis. In
this chapter, I will present an overview of several currently held ideas about how children
begin to leam language. The first group of theories concerns what are usually called
nativist or innatist theories. Nativists believe that fimdamental aspects o f linguistic
knowledge are inborn, including constraints that limit what a child expects words to be
and what a child’s first produced words might be. In the sense o f innateness as defined in
Chapter 1, these theories propose that there is representationally innate knowledge in the
brain that is unique to the human species and gives children access to language.^ These
theories predict that a child’s first words are meaningful and that children look for object
labels. I will contrast these ideas with emergentist theories and argue that children’s first

^ That is, this knowledge is hard-wired in or preset - see also Section 1.3.1.
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words are better explained by an emergentist viewpoint, which accepts that something
about language is innate but that innateness is architectural^ rather than representational.
Emergentists do not deny that something about language must be innate.
However, emergentists do not believe that there is language-j^ecy/fc information hard
wired into the brain. They argue that there are architecturally innate brain design
features that distinguish humans from even our close primate relatives, making language
possible. The human brain has evolved in a way that is structurally extremely plastic,
self-organizing, and experience-sensitive in ways that are architecturally unique to the
species but there are no special language processing or storage areas, separate from other
mechanisms, that store and process ju st linguistic information.
Finally, there are a number of theorists who suggest that both nativists and
emergentists have important ideas to contribute and that the similarities between the two
approaches outweigh the differences. I have called proponents o f this view synthesists.
The synthesists stress that both nativists and emergentists agree that some part of
language learning must be innate and at least some nativists have come to recognize the
importance o f general learning mechanisms (Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff 1996).
2.1 Nativist Theories
The subject o f language acquisition has fascinated people for thousands of years
and many theories have been proposed (Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek: 2000; Payne and
Wenger 1998). However, empirically verifiable theories were not developed until the

^ That is, the structure of the system defines what can be learned. See also Section 1.3.1. This does not
mean that children’s minds are blank slates with nothing in them. Emergentists contend that many generalpurpose abilities are either present at birth or develop before first words are produced. These domaingeneral capacitif include attention biases, size and shape discrimination, object permanence, and imitation.
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twentieth century. In the second half of the twentieth century, Noam Chomsky proposed
that children are bom with a system of principles, conditions, and mies that provides
what he saw as a missing link between the linguistic input and the knowledge that
children seem to know at an early age (Cook and Newson 1996; Chomsky 1959). His
ideas created an atmosphere in which additions and changes to his theory as well as
opposing theories have proliferated. What, then are the nativist theories? How do they
explain language acquisition as it applies to how children leam their first words?
2.1.1

Noam Chomsky and Universal Grammar
Chomsky observed that all normal people speak some language, that aU languages

seem to share certain attributes, and that all children leam their native language on about
the same time schedule (Cook and Newson 1996). Languages are acquired in a relatively
uniform sequence. Practice, reinforcement, and IQ (intelligence as measured by certain
standardized tests) appear to have little effect on the outcome. Skinner’s earlier
behaviorist theories claimed that language is acquired through operant conditioning but
Chomsky related language development more to growth than to learning. Chomsky
argued that the growth o f language is analogous to the development of a bodily organ
(Chomsky 1959; Chomsky 1975). Somehow, children are able to pick words out firom a
continuous stream o f sound and, with imperfect and deficient input, match words to their
correct reference in the environment. He concluded that there must be something unique
and special about the human species that is biological. Children must be bom with some
kind o f innate mechanism that allows them to leam language. Because aU children leam
language in all societies, input must only provide triggers for this mechanism and does
not play a central role (James 1990). In Chomsky’s view, there is not enough
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information in the input that children receive to explain the language knowledge that
children acquire at an early age. This apparent discrepancy between input and output has
been referred to as the “poverty o f stimulus” argument. Chomsky’s conclusion was that
the source o f the knowledge must be the mind itself (Cook and Newson 1996).
As evidence for this theory, nativists (Lightbown and Spada 1999) point out that
the acquisition o f language is an extremely complicated task, yet children seem to be able
to do it easily. Even children with otherwise serious handicaps manage to leam language.
Deaf children leam sign language if exposed to it in infancy. Mentally handicapped
children leam language more slowly but, nevertheless, seem able to leam it as well.
Children who are abused or neglected leam language if they are exposed to it at all.
The nativist claim is that the speech children hear is hrU of false starts, incomplete
sentences, and uncorrected errors, and that no one points out to children which sentences
they have heard were correct and which weren’t (Cook and Newson 1996). When they
do start to speak, they are not consistently corrected and, even when they are corrected,
they tend to focus on the meaning of words rather than the corrected form. Children
actually seem to ignore the corrections and say things the way they want to (Lightbown
and Spada 1999). What children hear underdetermines their observed competence.
Children are not provided with examples of all the linguistic rules of the adult language.
When these observations were first made, little serious study had been made of
children’s early speech. Language acquisition was seen as a logical problem that could
be solved without empirically studying children (Cook and Newson 1996). If we observe
the input to the child, the primary linguistic data, and the output, a generative grammar,
then what lies in between in the child’s mind must contain a Language Acquisition
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Device (LAD), now called the language faculty, that contains everything necessary for
language to be acquired. Chomsky equated the LAD to a species-specific language
faculty. Universal Grammar. If we carefully observe what is going in and what is coming
out, we should be able to deduce what is going on inside the LAD. For Chomsky, the
question to be answered about child language acquisition, then, was what the LAD
consists of and how children use it.
2.1,2

Syntactic Bootstrapping
The answer was that syntactic structure plays a central role in mediating word

meaning (Cook and Newson 1996). Certain kinds of word meanings are attached to
certain positions or functions in sentences and this can provide clues to help children
leam word meaning. Gleitman (1993) calls this process syntactic bootstrapping.
Children need input to be able to access and use the LAD but that they need to hear
certain kinds of sentences in order to set the parameters for their own language. They
need bracketed input, sentences with clear signs of phrase boundaries and
subcategorization fi*ames to determine how many phrasal participants are in the clause
(Cook and Newson 1996). This kind o f input provides a way for children to leam the
meanings of words and acquire knowledge of language.
Chomsky assumed that language and thought are autonomous and distinct.
Knowledge of a language consists o f processing speech in terms o f form classes and
using combinatorial rules expressed in terms of categories such as noun, noun phrase, and
subject of the verb. If thought and language are separate, then the task o f the child is to
find the relationship between the two (Macnamara 1977). The proposed LAD provides
not a full-blown set of grammar rules but a set of constraints on what those rules can be
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and a set o f procedures for learning (Bloom 1993). Chomsky’s theory is that the rules of
any language are structure-dependent (Cook and Newson 1996). Children know in
advance some possible forms that language may take. Hence, they have a head start at
linkmg language and thought, and can begin looking for word meanings at the time they
begin to speak.
The theory says that, because they already know phrasal structure, children can
exploit sentential information to actively search for meanings of words (Cook and
Newson 1996; Bates and Goodman 1999). A child hears a word, notes the clausal
context in which the word is used, and formulates a hypothesis about the concept to
which the word corresponds. Ideas about what form the concept might take differ. The
child’s concept may be a single primitive innate concept, a combination of primitive
concepts, or a prototype structure. However, a concept in some form must be available to
the child in order for the child to match meaning to form (Bloom 1993; Jackendoff 1992;
Fodor 1975).
These ideas, which have grown out of Chomsky’s Universal Grammar theories,
have received support from a number o f empirical studies. In the 1990’s, several papers
provided evidence that children can use syntactic frames to help determine the meanings
of novel verbs (Gleitman 1993; Naigles et al. 1995). Gleitman (1993) showed that blind
children can learn the subtle differences between look, watch, and see and that they must
be using syntactic frames to do so. Gold (1967) showed, mathematically, that without
knowing some critical things about the language being learned, if a child is presented
with context-free positive input only, languages would be unleamable. That is, the
learner must be limited to learning only certain kinds of grammars and not others. Such
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computational arguments lend support to Chomsky’s theory because they seem to show
that language would be unleamable unless there were some innate constraints on
language learning. That is, awareness of and ability to use the proposed LAD would be
impossible unless the child had some inborn knowledge of what language is.
Support for the claim that children do not receive or at least do not attend to
negative input comes from research reported by Bloom (1993). Observation of parents
and children shows that the grammaticality of children’s speech is not correlated with
parents’ approval or disapproval (Paul Bloom 1993). Parents appear to be more
interested in what their children say than how they say it.
Goldin-Meadow and Mylander (1993) report that deaf children seem to be
predisposed to linguistically analyze the words, signs, or gestures they use to
communicate. They conclude that several deaf children being raised in hearing families
can assign lexical meaning to spontaneous gestures used by their mothers and, in so
doing, go beyond the input they experienced. Their work also shows that the proposed
LAD is not limited to auditory language but applies to any mode of communication that
entails a generative grammar. The study supports the idea that children are following
innate patterns o f development that appear to be unaffected by what their parents provide
for input.
If a Language Acquisition Device helps children begin to learn language, damage
to it should result in specific, detectable impairments. Williams Syndrome is a form of
mental retardation in which a child is severely mentally handicapped in many respects
and may have a measured IQ of only 40 to 60. Surprisingly, language development
appears to be unaffected or even enhanced. Children speak fluently and enthusiastically
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and delight in novel or unusual words (Bates and Goodman 1999; Trask 1997). On the
other hand, damage to Broca’s area, located just behind the left temple, can cause
sufferers to have difficulties producing grammatical structures and understanding
grammatically complex sentences. Wernicke’s area is located just above and behind the
left ear. Damage to this area results in fluent but meaningless speech (Trask 1997).
These results provide some neurolinguistic evidence that there is a language module that
is separate in the brain from other kinds of mental activity, is different from other mental
processes, and that children must have access to it in order to successfully learn to talk.
Noam Chomsky’s response to behaviorist explanations o f language acquisition
reflected his observations that children do not simply memorize and repeat their parents’
speech but use language creatively from the time o f their earliest speech (Cook and
Newson 1996). Chomsky assumed that input is underdetermined, hence, cannot account
for a child’s relatively easy and rapid acquisition of language. Therefore, there must be a
genetically determined program to look for specific information. Chomsky’s ideas led to
the development of the syntactic bootstrapping hypothesis - children’s innate knowledge
of syntax so tightly limits possible grammars that a small amount of input is sufficient to
build word meanings, determine word classes, and develop subcategorization frames for
verbs. Syntactic bootstrapping claims that, even at the beginning of word production,
children are sensitive to phrase structure and grammatical roles.
2.1.3

Semantic bootstrapping
Macnamara (1977) proposed that the child’s cognitive ability to understand

something that is happening while listening to adults talk gives the child access to a basis
for understanding the meaning o f the words used to describe the event (Macnamara 1977;
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Snow 1999). The term semantic bootstrapping describes the mechanism that allows a
child to construct a semantic representation of input with the help o f context (Pinker
1987). Pinker (1994) proposed that children are able to determine the meaning of a
phrase from a situation. The claim is that children are bom with knowledge that allows
them to link the labels they hear to their semantic counterpart. The child understands
semantic entities such as thing, or causal agent and expects the input to contain tokens of
them in the forms of, for instance, nouns and subjects (Pinker 1987). This explanation
assumes that children are able to parse the input into words and that they possess innate
linking rules for joining the words they hear to the appropriate classes (Hirsh-Pasek and
Golinkoff 1996). Paul Bloom (1993) describes the process as a one-way mapping from
cognition to form. Children learn word meanings by linking their use to a perceptually
salient feature o f a situation. In this theory, the child is able to learn syntax because of
innate cognitive abilities rather than using innate Universal Grammar to help discover
word meanings. As a child acquires more word meanings, lexical knowledge can
combine with an understanding of events in the world to provide the semantic analysis
from which grammar can be bootstrapped (Snow 1999).
While syntactic bootstrapping relies on domain-specific"^ innate knowledge to
provide the key to language acquisition, semantic bootstrapping proposes that both

^ As applied to language learning, domain specificity or modularity is the theory that the brain has
a special-purpose learning device that is dedicated to learning language (Fodor 1975; Bates and Goodman
1999). In this theory, language is considered to be a domain-specific distinct mental capacity, reflecting
knowledge that is not wholly derived from general cognitive capacities (Pettito 1996). On the other hand,
if language develops out of domain-general capacities, then children’s first words are not preprogrammed
and they are not searching for object labels. This would mean that early words are the result of a human
brain’s capacities for information-processing and problem-solving combined with other innately human but
non-linguistic processes.
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domain-specific and domain-general processes are involved (Bloom 1993; Hirsh-Pasek
and Golinkoff 1996). That is, general learning devices such as pattern detection are
important for acquiring language. However, semantic bootstrapping theory holds that
word meanings cannot be acquired unless children are innately predisposed to entertain
only certain hypotheses (Markman 1993). Pinker’s theories stress learning as a
fundamental aspect o f language and other cognitive domains, and provide for a seamless
continuum fi-om pre-linguistic to linguistic behavior both for an individual child and for
the species. Semantic bootstrapping theory places more of the burden o f language
acquisition on the child’s learning capacities than syntactic bootstrapping and accepts the
necessity for a large amount o f linguistic input to accomplish this (Ulbaek 1998).
The acquisition of word meanings is a central issue for the semantic bootstrapping
hypothesis. The theory says that children initially only allow a single meaning for a
single word (Markman 1993). Since any single word may have a large number of
logically possible meanings even when the child and adult are attending to the same
referent (Lederer et al. 1995), there must be a way to place limits on what words can
mean. Semantic bootstrapping says that a Language Acquisition Device provides
constraints on the child’s representational (perceptual and conceptual) biases. These
constraints limit the number o f hypotheses that the child can entertain and lead a child to
favor some hypotheses over others (Bloom 1993). The theory further says that the
concepts for word categories and the rules that link words to these concepts are innate
and that the beginning language learner can use an emerging understanding of the design
of the language being learned as a guide to a new word’s mapping (Lederer et al. 1995).
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The child’s first words are meaningful and are matched to innate prototypes (Pinker
1987).
Golinkoff et al. (1994) say that the process of early word learning has three basic
lexical principles or constraints. First words can be acquired because children know that
words 1) refer to objects, actions, and attributes, 2) that they map to whole objects, and 3)
that they represent categories of objects, not just the original referent. These constraints
potentiate learning by limiting the number of hypotheses the learner considers. This is
the same as saying that semantic bootstrapping allows children begin word production by
mapping word forms with innate concepts. These concepts are linked to words at the
time they are learned and children actively look for names o f whole objects. In other
words, children come to the language-leaming task expecting words to be object labels.
There are research studies that support this theory. Studies reported by Golinkoff
et al. (1994) show that infants respond very early to pointing gestures and learn to use
such gestures to establish joint reference. Establishment of joint reference is important if
children use context to learn word meaning. A 1990 study by Waxman and Kosowski
(1990) showed that children as young as two years old interpret novel nouns as referring
to category relationships. The youngest subjects in these studies also interpreted novel
adjectives as taxonomic categories, supporting the theory that children begin by assuming
new words are nouns even when used syntactically as adjectives. Waxman (1994) further
investigated the process by testing two, three, and four-year old children. In all age
groups, children who were given a novel noun and asked to find “another one” extended
the meaning to include taxonomic alternatives. When the children were not given a label
for the indicated object, they picked alternatives randomly, suggesting that it is the name
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o f the object that allows the child to form a category/ Markman (1993) proposes that
children learn word meanings using two basic principles. First, when presented with an
object and a label, children assume that the label they hear is the name of the whole
object. Even the youngest children in her studies (two years old) followed this rule.
Second, her mutual exclusivity principle says that children expect only one name for an
object and, when presented with a second name for an object, they assume it is either a
name for some salient aspect of the object or the name for the substance the object is
made o f When presented with a second label for an object, three and four-year olds tend
to reject the new label as a name for the object and seek to find another aspect of the
object to label. These two principles allow children to first find a name for the object and
then provide a way to acquire other kinds o f words, such as adjectives, that describe
objects for which they already have a name. They provide the mechanism for semantic
bootstrapping theory to allow for the acquisition of words beyond object labels. These
studies show that children as young as two years old can leam names of things and use
real-world situations to match meaning to form. However, all o f these studies of twoyear old children only show how children may use what they already know about
categories to leam new words. They actually show nothing at all about how children
begin the process.

^ In February 1999,1 ran a small experiment designed to test Sandra Waxman’s ideas. Her studies of twoyear-olds involved children who were an average of 2 years and 7 months of age with the youngest child
being 2 years and 1 month. I tested a boy who was 23 months old at the time of the experiment and used
her methods. The child was shown a page with an object in the center of a page and four other objects.
Two were related thematically, two taxonomically. He was given a novel name for the center object and
asked to find another one. My results exactly repeated her findings. Even though this child was less than
two years old, he exhibited a systematic approach to interpreting novel nouns and provided support for the
idea that children of this age exhibit bias toward extending object labels to other objects of the same kind
rather than to objects that are thematically related.

48

Semantic bootstrapping models of language acquisition assume that children are
able to use special linguistic and general cognitive abilities to understand the meaning o f
a sentence from its context and link the sounds o f the words they hear to innate concepts.
In particular, they have concepts for categories, such as agent, and they look for words in
their linguistic environment that match these concepts. The theory proposes that children
actively search for names o f things and that they are constrained to initially assume that
the words they hear are names o f whole objects,
I will argue that, while there may be substantial evidence that children can and do
use context and whole object principles by the time they are two years old, it has not been
demonstrated that this is how they begin the process. In fact, the evidence shows that
children do not have a preference for object labels, that words are not initially mapped to
categories, and that an alternative synthesis theory based on emergentism better explains
the production o f very early words.
2.2 Emergentist Explanations
Bootstrapping theories hold that children need more than verbal input to leam
language. Syntactic bootstrapping requires children to have the innate ability to map
sentence structure in the form of structural hierarch and possible subcategorization
frames to contextual clues and asserts that children need only a minimal number o f key
phrases to determine which verbs obtain which sets of subcategorizations, as well as
other parametric variation. Semantic bootstrapping proposes that children need certain
information from context to link meaning to form but that their ability to pick out what
they need from the input is enhanced by innate knowledge in the form of semantic cues
that correspond to perceptually salient contextual features. Many researchers now believe
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that context is important in developing meaning but not everyone agrees that the
linguistic knowledge children need to process input is representationally innate —hard
wired to at least some degree and present at the beginning o f language acquisition.
Emergentists agree that the human language capacity is distinct from other forms of
animal commumcation, but assert that there is no language-specific module in the brain.
They propose that language is the result of a large number of complex interactions
between general processes. Language is the result of many little things, none o f which,
alone, would be expected to result in anything veiy dramatic but, taken together, produce
something radically new (Elman 1999). Emergentists reject the claim that there is a
special language faculty. They see language as an emergent property of architecturally
innate mechanisms rather than the result o f representationally innate knowledge about
language. That is, it is the structure o f the brain, not what it contains, that constrains how
learning can occur. Children’s first words are the result of physical maturation and
domain-general cognitive abilities. Emergentists do not reject the claim that children
“know” a great deal when they begin to talk but that the knowledge they have about the
world comes from general cognitive processes, not from special language knowledge.
Emergentists rely on computer models o f neural networks to show how language
learning can take place and how language rules can be learned by a system that does not
have the rules already built in. Since the artificial neurons in these networks are heavily
interconnected, they are called connectionist models. Computer models allow
researchers to test their theories o f how brains work and have been successful in
demonstrating that at least some o f the theory is plausible.
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2.2.1

Cormectionism
Early optimism about the abilities o f computers to simulate human language was

replaced with disappointment when, in the 1960’s, attempts to create language translation
programs demonstrated that human language is a complex problem that computers could
not easily solve (Crevier 1993). So it is understandable that linguists, knowing that
language cannot be processed linearly, are skeptical of claims that computer models can
replicate any kind of language learning. However, linear processing models have been
replaced by models that researchers think more closely imitate what happens in the brain.
One o f the earliest such models was McClelland and Rumelhart’s interactive activation
model o f word recognition (Elman et al. 1996; Payne and Wenger 1998). In this 1981
model, word recognition is both data-driven at the level of information in the input and
conceptually driven from higher-level processes. These processes work simultaneously
and in parallel. When a written word is recognized, for instance, information about the
features or basic pieces of letters is perceived and passed to the part o f the brain that
processes letter shapes. Connections to some letters are activated; others are inhibited.
Information at the letter level suggests possibilities about what the word might be.
Cognitive or “top-down” processes limit and define what word and meaning is activated.
Because all the pieces o f information are simultaneously connected, this kind o f model
has been termed connectionist and the theory is called connectionism.
Rumelhart and McClelland suggested that the mechanisms that process language
and make judgments of grammaticality are constructed in such a way that their
performance can be characterized by rules, but that the mechanism that produces them
does not contain any statement of a rule or guiding principle (Rumelhart and McClelland
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1993).^ In other words, the rules are not explicitly written into the system to begin with
but they emerge because of the way the pieces of the system are connected.
Connectionist theory proposes that the interaction of different modalities, such as
vision and hearing, can give rise to developmental phenomena that would not emerge if
they acted separately (Plunkett 1995). Computer models using connectionist theory have
been used to model the acquisition o f grammar and the emergence of phonology,
grammaticality, and word meaning (Bates and Goodman 1999; Allen and Seidenberg
1999; Goldberg 1999). Most important for this thesis, computer models show that
concepts do not need to be present before words are learned. Concepts may develop
slowly after words begin to be produced (Plunkett 1995). Plunkett describes a simulation
that was trained to associate images with words. This model demonstrated the early slow
acquisition o f word meaning as well as a dissociation between comprehension and
production and the typical overextension and underextension that have been
demonstrated in children’s early speech (Plunkett 1995; Bates et al. 1995). Learning
curves for both word recognition and production were similar to those of children
learning language (Plunkett 1995). The physical images presented to the computer to be
linked to words were variations of prototypes but the prototypes were never actually

^ In the mid 1980's, Rumelhart and McClelland applied their theory, now referred to as Parallel
Distributed Processing or PDP, to the problem of language acquisition. Selecting a language feature that
has traditionally been assumed to be rule-driven, they designed a computer program that used English
present tense verbs as input and produced the corresponding past tense as output. Their simple model did a
fair job of learning to produce correct past tenses for irregular as well as regular verbs and could produce,
with reasonable accuracy, the past tense even for unfamiliar verbs. This model provided early evidence
that rule-like behavior could be produced by a mechanism in which there is no explicit representation of
rules (Rumelhart and McClelland 1996).
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presented to the program while it was learning/ Nevertheless, during the testing phase,
the model identified prototypes more reliably than the images that the model had been
trained with. The model had extracted a central tendency from a group o f training
patterns. That is, the model recognized the prototype even though it had not seen it
before. The implication is that the acquisition of first words need not depend on the
presence of innate prototypes. Words can be learned from repeated presentation of
examples, and categories can emerge after word production begins.
Plunkett’s (1995) model exhibited a lag of production behind comprehension that
has also been recognized in young children.^ Plunkett suggests that this lag might be the
result o f the development of categories. He proposes a mechanism for how the two might
be related and how words might be produced without categories being present at the
beginning o f word production. During the early stages o f training, comprehension is
exhibited because labels may be better predictors of category membership than image
patterns. Labels are discrete and images tend to be what Plunkett calls “flizzy” predictors
of a category. Labels can trigger several possible correct images so the network exhibits
understanding of a word meaning when it is processed while image categories are still
difruse and may even overlap. Hence, it will be more difficult to select and produce a
correct label in a given situation for production. Until the network establishes an
accurate prototype o f the clustering of images, labels provide more reliable cues to
category membership than images. We know from many studies that this asymmetry is.

^ In psychology, the prototype theory of categorization assumes that a summary representation is preserved
in memory. A new memory trace is not stored for each item. Rather, a running average or central tendency
of presented examples is stored. This “average” item is called the prototype, (Payne and Wenger 1998)
®See Section 1.5.5 for a discussion of this phenomenon.
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in fact, very large in the early stages o f word learning but gradually disappears (Plunkett
1995; Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff 1996; Plaut and Kello 1999; Gupta and Dell 1999).
The dissociation between comprehension and production in computer models
demonstrates that concepts need not be present before words are comprehended but that
they may develop gradually as production begins.
Since emergentist theory holds that categorization and meaning emerge from the
way children process input rather than innate prototypes, one implication of this theory is
that there should be as much variation between children’s initial word production as there
is variation between children’s environments. In fact, several researchers have noted that
there are indeed very great differences in learning style (Fenson et al. 1994; Darley and
Winitz 1961 ; Bates et al. 1995). Emergentist theory says that language is the product of
interactions between many modalities, some of which can have enormous differences in
developmental rates. These differences could cause significant variation in the timing of
word comprehension as well as production (Bates et al. 1995).^
Studies with small numbers of children show what kinds of variation in linguistic
development are possible (Darley and Winitz 1961). But the extent and nature of such
variation is only evident when a large population is investigated (Bates et al. 1995).
Evidence from a sample o f more than 1,800 children relates the observed variations to
many factors including gender, birth order, and social class. In addition, the variables

^ For example, there is evidence that children with Downs Syndrome and at least some children with
Specific Learning Impairment may have one or more impairments in the auditory processing system as well
as general cognitive delays. Hence, it is not surprising that these individuals have the most difficulty
detecting, storing, and retrieving linguistic input that is lowest in acoustically phonological salience (Bates
and Goodman 1999).
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tested included cognitive abilities such as tool use and categorization, attention to spoken
words during the babbling stage, use of intonation during babbling, and interest in
mimicking parental actions and sounds. Their research confirmed that there is enormous
variability in the rate of children’s linguistic development and that only a combination of
factors could explain the differences.^^ These factors are both maturational and
environmental and cannot be explained by a single, language-specific module in the
child’s brain.
The emergentist position proposes that no special language faculty is necessary to
explain early word production. Concepts do not need to be pre-programmed but can be
acquired gradually along with word comprehension and production. Word meanings and
the categories they represent may be the result of word production rather a prerequisite
for it. The prediction that such emergent processes would result in a great deal o f
variation in the way children begin to leam their language has been verified by studies of
learning styles. I will provide evidence to support this claim and, further, suggest that
children’s very early vocabularies are an extension o f social interaction. However, any
theory o f early word production assumes that children can segment some sounds out of
the speech stream. The next section will address how emergentism might explain how

Two of the prototypical strands of learning styles that could be identified were; Strand 1 which tended to
be first-bom females, word-oriented, object oriented, and less interested in imitation. These learners had a
high proportion of nouns in their first 50 words. A typical Strand 2 learner was a later bom male,
intonation-oriented, person-oriented, more likely to imitate spoken words, and had a lower proportion of
nouns in the first 50 words. These strands are similar to what other researchers’ have variously termed
analytic v. holistic, referential v. expressive, and nominal v. pronominal that have been used to classify
chil&en’s personalities. However, they emphasized that these categories are examples not definitions of
learning style. The important result was that there is demonstrably huge variation among children’s
leaming styles.
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children separate some sounds Jfrom the speech stream and why the sounds that become
words are identified.
2.2.2

Word Segmentation
Before they can begin to speak, infants have to be able to pick out meaningful

units from the input. This process of dividing up the speech stream is called
segmentation. What seems to an adult like a series of words is actually an acoustically
continuous stream o f sound. How are infants able to segment this stream? Regardless of
the meaning content that may or may not be attached to separate segments, children must
be able to separate out the meaningfiil bits contained in spoken language. In fact, this
unbroken speech stream contains language-specific clues. For instance, languages may
contain differences in pitch, in vowel lengths, or in stress that even pre-linguistic infants
can detect and that may be necessary for them to discover how their language is
constructed. Infents as young as eight months already know what kinds of sounds can
occur at the beginnings and endings of words (Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek 2000).
The cognitive processes that help infants segment words begin to develop very
early. Femald (1993) suggests that paying attention to speech is a survival strategy.
Prehnguistic infants prefer speech to other sounds but show no preference for words
pronounced in their own language over any other. By nine months, however, infants
begin to show preferences for their own language by turning their heads toward a
loudspeaker more often when they hear words in the language they are learning than
some other language (Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek 2000).* ^ Although not yet able to pick

** For example, Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek (2000) report that Dutch children prefer to listen to Dutch
words and English children prefer English words.
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out individual words, as a first step, they become tuned to the sounds of their own
language and they are sensitive to acoustic cues of phrase boundaries (Golinkoff et al.
1999). Before they are able to process words linguistically, infants do some kind of
acoustic analysis o f their own language.
The next step is to be able to segment the meaningfiil chunks in speech.
Emergentists believe that the acoustic properties of speech are statistical in nature and
help the child pick out words (Aslin et al. 1999). They have been able to show that the
transitional probabilities that certain sounds foUow other sounds can predict word
boundaries. These statistical properties may be what guide the infant to segment the
speech stream. Aslin et al. (1999) showed that adults, children aged seven to eight years
old, and even eight-month-old babies can pick out nonsense words firom an unbroken
stream o f nonsense syllables when the targeted nonsense words reappear predictably in
the speech stream.

As little as 45 seconds of listening to a series of “sentences,” within

which a target word is embedded, is sufficient to induce a difference in the amount of
time eight-month-old infants spend listening to that word versus an unknown word. In
other words, infants are able to pick out repeated linguistic units fi*om a stream of sound
simply by the probability of the occurrence of sound combinations and, moreover, they
can do it with very little exposure. When pure tones were substituted for syllables, adults
and infants alike extracted repeated sequences the same way they had done with nonsense

Asiin et al. (1999) presented adults with “word” pairs - a nonsense word that had been presented in the
sound stream and one that had not. After only 21 minutes of exposure, subjects were able correctly choose
the previously heard word 76% of the time. Eight-month-old infants were tested with the preferential
listening technique. Sounds were played through a loudspeaker and repeated until the infant looked away
or until a predefined maximum was met. The test phase recorded how long infants listened to a word
before getting bored and looking away. Listening times were significantly different for word and non-word
test items, an indication that infants discriminated between them.
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words. The authors conclude that the ability to segment words out o f the speech stream
is at least partly due to a general statistical leaming mechanism that can operate on a wide
range o f acoustic input rather than from innate knowledge.
Redington and Chater (1997) reviewed a number of computer simulations and
distribution studies, concluding that there is enough statistical infonnation in normal
speech to account for word segmentation and the development of word classes and
meanings. Gupta and Dell (1999) have shown that a variety of sequential tasks, including
both repetition o f nonsense syllables and a skill task of keying numbers, benefit by
having sequences repeat even when no feedback is given to indicate whether they are
correct or incorrect.

Analysis o f error-production shows that occurrence constraints

arise at different levels - those within words or numbers, those within lists, and those
across all lists. They equate these constraints with syllable level, experiment level, and
language-wide level.
The implication o f these experiments is that there is a general human sensitivity to
sequential constraints and that these constraints emerge at multiple levels in procedural
memory (Aslin et al. 1999). This is the same kind o f sensitivity that arises in the
processing o f sound sequences. Other studies have shown that infants are sensitive to the
Aslin et al. (1999) acknowledge that many clues are necessary to help infants leam where meaning unit
boundaries occur. Their studies were designed to eliminate other clues such as context, prosodic regularity,
and stress patterns and test what role statistical data might play in predicting word boundaries and whether
that ability was strictly linguistic or Whether it might be a general leaming mechanism. They designed their
data to contain transitional regularities. This statistic involves calculating the probabilities that certain
sounds follow other sounds. For example, if the transitional probability between two syllables were close
to 1.0, those syllables would be within a word. If the transitional probability between two syllables were
close to 0.0, this indicated a likely word boundary.
Participants were given lists of 5-digit numbers to key into a computer. No feedback was provided for
the response. Numbers were keyed and the enter key pressed. One second later, the next number was
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prosodie regularity of their own language at an early age (Aslin et al. 1999; Hirsh-Pasek
and Golinkoff 1999), and Cutler (1994) demonstrated how stress might be used as a cue.
The information needed to segment words from the speech stream is almost certainly
contained within that stream itself. While this does not explain the development of
meaning, infants must be able to find words and we do not need to rely on innate
knowledge or bootstrapping to explain how they do it.
Advances in cognitive skills at around ten months allow analysis of speech
information in new ways. At six months, infants could discriminate changes in stress
pattern or changes in syllable pattern but are not able to coordinate both. By nine
months, they began to be able to integrate prosodic grouping with distributional
information, detecting changes in sequences of syllables based on predictable stress
patterns. At ten months, children lose the ability to discriminate between wow-native
speech sounds. Researchers suggest that this is because children are now able to predict
what acoustic variability is functional in their own language-leaming environment
(Worker et al. 1996).
Certainly the ability to segment repeated sequences from a continuous stream of
sound is not all that is necessary for children to leam to speak their language. However,
the studies reviewed here show that it is, in principle, possible to explain how the
acoustic stream might be segmented by processes that may mature slowly and that are
domain-general in nature. Speech segmentation alone does not result in the acquisition of
language knowledge and does not require domain-specific processes or innate linguistic

presented for entry. Some numbers appeared multiple times during the experiment while others appeared
only once. Errors declined gradually and progressively for items that repeated (Gupta and Dell 1999).
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knowledge. However, the ability to divide up the input into meaningful pieces is
necessary for children to begin to leam words and the research shows this can happen
from statistical segmentation processes that occur without conceptual mapping.
2.3 Syntheses
This paper has thus far reviewed two main ideas about language acquisition.
Nativist theories hold that there is some kind of representationally innate, or
preprogrammed, language knowledge present at the time that children begin to leam
language. Emergentists point to the success of artificial neural networks in modeling
features o f language acquisition and claim that stmctural or architectural innateness can
fully account for language. Although it seems that these two views are inherently
incompatible, there are researchers who accept many o f the principles from both views.
These researchers believe that the way children leam language is best e?q)lained by
combining the two views and they have tried to provide synthesis accounts of language
acquisition, including how children leam their first words.
For instance, while syntactic bootstrapping theory holds that there is a languagespecific organ in the brain responsible for language acquisition. Pinker (1994) and
Gleitman (1993) suggest that children need to use both domain-specific and domaingeneral processes to analyze input. Pinker (1987) likens the language acquisition task to
a puzzle with multiple pieces. Solving one piece o f the puzzle would lead to solutions for
all the other pieces but none of them can be solved m isolation. The problem for the
child is finding a place to start. For Pinker, the solution o f this puzzle is that innate
constraints, which he calls rule prototypes, give the child a head start in mapping form to
meaning. But he believes the rest o f the solution lies in the input.
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Gleitman (1993) agrees with Pinker’s claims that children can induce noun
meanings by linking their use to a situation. However, as discussed in Section 2.1.1, she
has shown that this ‘‘word to world” mapping cannot be the only way that children leam
words. She proposes that children often understand the meaning o f a sentence first and
deduce word meanings by analyzing the content and structure of that sentence. This kind
of mapping provides a way for children to leam verb meanings when observation fails
them, as she says it eventually must. The process is categorical rather than probabilistic
in that the children need only a small database to conclude that a word has a particular
meaning in a particular syntactic environment. She concludes that children are able to
play two imperfect and insufficient processes (semantic bootstrapping and syntactic
bootstrapping) against each other to derive the best result.
At the other end of the spectrum, emergentists must acknowledge that language is
universal among normal human beings. They take this to mean that some kind of
prerequisites must be present for language to develop. Among the emergentists, there are
two groups —those who believe socialization is a special innate prerequisite and those
who believe that general human cognitive development makes language possible. If a
synthesis isj30ssible, it will come fi*om the understanding that language acquisition must
be the result of the interaction of many factors. I have suggested that general cognitive
development is responsible for children’s early word production rather than innate
knowledge and that children are especially sensitive to social factors, so it will be
important to understand what roles socialization and cognition might play in that
synthesis.
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2.3.1

Socialization and Cognition
Researchers who emphasize socialization as a way for language to begin

emphasize that children are active communicators virtually from birth. First words, say
Grieve and Hoogenraad (1986), do not spring from nowhere but represent a point on the
continuum o f the child’s developing ability to communicate. The child’s first words are
continuous with what has been happening before words first appear. Early utterances are
frequently employed to initiate and maintain the sort of social interaction the child has
become used to. Social roles must play an important part in language acquisition (Ochs
and Shieffelin 1995). Cross-culturally, people rely on similar linguistic means to
accomplish similar social ends. However, these ends are culturally organized according
to their situational scope and significance, that is, who, when, where, and how these ends
may appropriately be accomplished and what they mean to the participants. Cultures
differ in how children are addressed and how children are expected to speak.

Ochs and

Shieffelin (1995) suggest that the primary goal of language is to socialize infants into
culturally appropriate persons. Repeated interactions with their environment provide
children with “scripts” that serve as the substrate for initial language learning. Social
processes, such as joint attention, script construction, and correction, form a foundation
for language acquisition (Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff 1996).

For instance, children may be addressed differently based on their age and/or sex. Children may only
rarely hear certain words that t h ^ are, nevertheless, expected to use when they address adults. In some
cultures, parents expect their children’s first words to be certain culturally determined and highly
conventionalized forms. For example, in Kaluli society, everyone’s first words are “mother” and “breast.”
In Samoan communities, the child’s first word is part of a curse (Ochs and Shieffelin 1995). In European
and American societies, mama and papa or dada are expected to be and very often are a child’s first words
(de Boysson-Bardies and Vihman unpublished).
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Some social interactionists believe socialization provides a complete explanation
for language acquisition but others see it as only a way o f facilitating word learning/^
Catherine Snow (1981; 1986; 1999) agrees that syntactic and semantic bootstrapping are
important for children to acquire language knowledge but sees social precocity as a more
likely innate feature that allows children to leam their first words. By the end of their
first year, children have developed the capacity of intersubjectivity, the understanding
that other people have minds like theirs. The understanding that other’s minds are like
their own leads to an acceptance o f conventionalized communication, something Snow
considers a trigger for the children to begin word leaming. Children’s expectation that
other people will interpret the signals they produce as intentional attempts to
communicate provides them with a motive to produce words.
Several researchers believe that cognitive development plays a primary role in the
acquisition o f language (Bates et al. 1979; Slobin 1992; Peters 1986). The processes a
child uses to leam words parallel those o f other cognitive developments. These include
paying attention to perceptually salient stimuli, remembering the stimuli, and classifying
the stimuli. Children use these abilities to make sense o f words the same way they make
sense out of other cognitive domains. Bates et al. (1979) suggest, for instance, that the
ability to use tools is accompanied by cognitive advances such as planning, sequencing of
steps, and part-whole analysis. Tool use is related to language —both begin the same
way cognitively but diverge in their requirements of substitutes (Bates et al. 1979). Other
cognitive abilities that have been correlated with word leaming include imitation and

That is, leaming to produce words, not necessarily the same as language leaming. See also Section
1.3.5.
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means-ends abilities (Bates et al. 1979; Uzgiris 1981). These cognitive prerequisites for
language develop continuously, and handicaps in one cognitive area may be overcome by
strengths in other areas (Bates et al. 1979; Ingram 1981). Bates peculates that these
cognitive skills may even develop independently of each other until each reaches a
critical threshold, allowing the child to begin to use words.
2.3.2

Does the Synthesis Approach Work?
We can now list a number o f things about language acquisition that many

researchers agree on. For instance, language acquisition is generally believed to be the
result o f a complex interaction of factors (Slobin 1992; Elman et al. 1996; Hirsh-Pasek
and Golinkoff 1996). Leaming a language depends on culling information from a
number of different inputs (Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff 1996). Solving the language
puzzle requires input from both innate constraints and environmental input (Pinker 1987).
Clearly, the solution to any humanproblem, linguistic or otherwise, lies in the interaction
of three fectors —genes, environment, and the structure of the problem (Bates et al.
1979). Genes and environment p ro vide causal input while the task structure provides the
rest o f the solution. Children are sensitive to properties of their own language such as
prosody, stress, and_phonemes at a veiy early age, earlier than has previously been
recognized. Slobin’s (1992) cross-linguistic research on child language acquisition
provides evidence that some sort of maturationalprocess is also involved.

While not

agreeing on exactly what they are, there is at least agreement among researchers that

For example, in a polysynthetic language such as Greenlandic Eskimo, input consists of complex verbs,
and children go through a single morpheme stage,progressing to a two-morpheme stage.
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many factors, some innate, some derived from the ii^ut, are involved in language
acquisition.
Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff (1996) suggest that a compromise is possible between
nativistic and emergentist theories by collapsing the dichotomies that separate them.
They say that ideas about child language acquisition all fall on a continuum. Theories of
initial language structure range from the j3urely linguistic to social/cognitive; theories of
language acquisition mechanism range from the domain-specific to the domain-general;
theories about the source o f the initial structure of child language range from innate
predisposition to construction from input. Theories tend to group themselves into
families - the nativists who argue that critical j>arts of early linguistic structure is domainspecific and innate, and the emergentists who argue that the cognitive/social features of
early language come from domain-general, constructed sources. The development of a
synthesis theory of initial word production depends on showing that both sides share
common ideas.
For instance, emergentists agree that a minimum requirement for word leaming is
the linkage o f “acoustic packages,” containing jjrosodic and phonemic properties, with
events (Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff 1996). This soimd-event mapping is not necessarily
linguistic but may even be the sound of music associated with the movement of a mobüe.
Cognitive and perceptual limitations may provide the source of some o f the constraints
on what a child can leam and use (Griffiths 1986). At least some nativists (Pinker 1987;
Pinker and Prince 1988) recognize the importance of domain-general processes, and
emergentists (Karmiloff-Smith 1993) agree that some parts of the language acquisition
process are innately specified, although they don’t necessarily have to be domain-specific
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in the beginning.** Karmilofif-Smith (1993) suggests that domain-^ecificity may be a
developmental process —initially domain-general functions become domain-specific as
the child matures and acquires language. Many researchers have suggested that social
interaction (Grieve and Hoogenraad 1986; Ochs and Shieffelin 1995; Hirsh-Pasek and
Golinkoff 1996; Snow 1999) and cognitive development (Bates et al. 1979; Slobin 1992;
Peters 1986; Ingram 1981) are important factors in the ability o f infants to leam words.
Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff (1996) argue that the disagreements about whether or
not language is innate would collapse if emergentists were to grant that children are
predisposed to search for certain kinds of information in their environment at the time of
first word production and can derive a limited class of linguistic generalizations at that
time. Whether innate or the_product o f domain-generaljjrocesses, certain language
relevant information must be available to children by the time grammar leaming begins.
For Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff, the question is not whether language is innate and
domain-specific, but rather how much language-specific knowledge and what kinds of
domain-specificj)rocesses are necessary to ensure that la n g u ie leaming takes j)lace? In
the next chapter, I will point out specific problems with each of the presented theories
and argue that a synthesis is only_possible if we assume that what is innate is the structure
o f the brain and the desire to communicate. Children’s first words represent leaming but
are not language in the generative sense; t h ^ are not mapped to innate categories, and
are not indicative o f real language knowledge when they are first produced.

For example, Karmiloff-Smith (1996) says that the early plasticity of the infant’s mind suggests that a
radical nativistjjosition must be wrong. Special attention biases, such as those for s h ^ e and size
discrimination, can channel the way in which even a newborn processes linguistically relevant inputs.
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Chapter 3
Critique of Reviewed Theories

3.0 IntroAiciion
In Chapter 2 ,1 discussed several theories which purport to explain how children
begin to leam language. Each th eo ^ addresses the issue of what children’s first words
represent and how children acquire them Each theory makes a reasoned and rational
contribution to the_problem In this chapter, I will investigate some o f the difiSculties
with each theory. Early word production is not satisfactorily explained by genetic
programs or as an instinct. While emergentists have argued that the input is richer than
Chomsky earlier claimed, computer models are unable to explain some features of the
process. Some of the proposed theories explain the acquisition o f first words better than
others, but there are parts of each that seem to be able to answer different parts of the
problem The solution to the problem o f child language acquisition m ^ lie in a synthetic
approach.
3.1 Nativist Weaknesses
Whether syntactic bootstrapping or semantic bootstrapping is claimed as the
trigger that allows children to gain access to a Language Acquisition Device (LAD),
nativist theories hinge on some kind of specific linguistic knowledge existing in the
genetic code. This is a major claim of the nativist viewpoint. The apparently most
compelling nativist argument, however, for the innateness of linguistic knowledge is the
poverty o f stimulus argument. According to this argument, there is not enough
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information in the linguistic input that children are exposed to, to account for the
language competence that children achieve. Hence, it is logical to conclude that what is
missing from the input was already jDresent (Cook and Newson 1996). In the following
sections, I will discuss nativist suggestions that language knowledge could be coded for
genetically and the necessity for a_poverty o f stimulus argument. I will evaluate syntactic
and semantic bootstrapping arguments, and look at the need to explain language learning
as an instinct. Finally, I will evaluate claims that first words are linked to innate
prototypes.
3.1.1

Why Genetics Can’t Account For Grammar
Chomsly’s conclusion that Universal Grammar must exist because language is

too complex to be accounted for by the data that children receive seems, at first glance,
like an incontrovertible argument. Surely, given the circumstances, there is no other way
to account for the rapid acquisition of language. There are problems with this argument,
however. One problem is that ofgenetics. If language knowledge is built into the child’s
brain, even if it develops slowly as part of the maturational process, it must somehow be
coded for in our genes. And if it is coded in the genes, then one must be able to show
that it is plausible to account genetically for a complex behavior to develop in the human
being.
Elman et al. (1996) ask us to consider several important features o f genetics that
were not known until recently. First, the amount of DNA that must account for
preprogrammed language knowledge is surprisingly small. Scientists have always
assumed that there were thousands, perhaps hundreds o f thousands o f genes. Conpletion
of the Human Genome Project produced the surprising result that there are only about
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30,000 human genes (Paabo 2001a). We already knew that, genetically, we are almost
identical to our primate cousins (Paabo 2001a; Paabo 2001b; Deacon 1997; Dunbar
1997). The difference between human and chimpanzee DNA is only about 1.6%, now
recognized to be only a few hundred genes. These few genes must account for all the
many differences between the species, including language. The j)roblem, however, is
more complex than just the amount of DNA. It is not just a question o f how many genes
it would take to_prqgram^rammar but a matter of what kind of genetic development is
necessary for language in the human species.
Scientists stacking DNA have discovered two kinds of^enetic development. In
mosaic development, cells develop relatively independently o f each other.

However,

while mosaic development works for small, sirnple creatures like worms, higher
organisms have opted for the second kind of development - regulatory development. In
regulatory development, the outcome o f cellular division is under the broad control of
DNA but the final outcome depends largely on interactions that occur while the young
organism is^ow ing. There are considerable advantages to regulatory development.
Neighboring cells can often compensate for damage to another group of cells. Greater
complexity in^enetic expression is jjossible when^enes interact with each other. The

For instance, a species of worm, C. elegans, has been studied extensively. It develops rapidly and it
appears that most of its cells seem preprogrammed to grow into particular organs with a particular
organization. Each cell grows up to be what it is supposed to be, regardless of what the rest of the body
does. While this might seem like the safest way for an organism to develop, there is a price; the genome
must be close to a conyjlete blugirint for the entire body. Single-celled animals have 10^ to 10^ basej)airs
making up the structure of the DNA code and there is a predictable increase in the number of base pairs up
to the complexity level of the mollusks. After that, more complexity is not associated with more DNA.
Higher animals level off at around 10^ to 10*' base pairs. Flowering plants actually have more base pairs
than mammals. It seems there is a limit to how much DNA can be stored in a cell and safely replicated
across generations (Elman et al. 1996).
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trade-off is that the process o f development is slowed down greatly to allow these
interactions the time they need to complete their processes. If humans developed the
mosaic way, the entire organism would be created in just 47 binary divisions (Elman et
al. 1996). Instead, our genes are algorithmic - they develop by way of algorithms rather
than by descriptions. That is, they depend on regularities in the input rather than carrying
encoded information. The interaction o f genetics with the environment provides the
solution to the developmental problems of higher organisms with only a small amount of
pre-wired biases (Elman et al. 1996). Studies o f DNA activity support the conclusion
that it is the way the structure of the human brain develops that is responsible for the
difference between humans and chimpanzees (Paabo 2001b). Human and chimpanzee
gene activity is very similar in the blood and liver but the overall rate of activity in the
human brain is three times that o f the chimpanzees. Because the differences in human
and chimp DNA are so small, it cannot be the difference in the information that they
carry but rather the way they are expressed that creates the very large differences in
structure.
Another key point in the nativist argument is that there is an “organ” in the brain
that is dedicated to language. Scientists used to think they had found such an organ when
they discovered that patients with damage to Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas often have
language difiBculties (Payne and Wenger 1998; Pinker 1994). However, language
problems are not inevitable. Studies have shown that damage to these areas does not
always result in aphasias (Bates and Goodman 1999). Most important for early language
acquisition, studies o f infants with fi*ontal lobe damage showed no delay in language if
the damage occurred prior to 19 months of age. Further, MRI, PET, and CAT scan
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studies show that many parts of the brain are activated when speech is processed, not just
these areas. Also, Broca’s area is used for other tasks - adult damage to it results in loss
o f general cognitive abilities and aU parts o f Broca’s area show activation during
nonverbal motor planning tasks. Finally, different parts of the brain are activated in
different people even when they are processing the same linguistic data (Deacon 1997).
Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas appear to be important to language and may be specialized
in some way but are not entirely dedicated to speech processing and have no special
status at all until some time after language begins to be acquired (Bates and Goodman
1999). In summary, recent discoveries about DNA and how genes are expressed cast
doubt on the theory that language knowledge is encoded in our genes. Further,
neurological evidence suggests that there is no physically separate language organ
dedicated to linguistic processing.
3.1.2

The Stimulus is Not Impoverished
The poverty of stimulus argument is that the language input available to children

is not sufficient to account for what a native speaker knows about grammar (Cook and
Newson 1996). The strongest counter to this argument is the kind of computer modeling
described by Elman et al. (1996) that was discussed in section 2.2.1. It is possible to
design a computer program that can leam both grammar and semantics when presented
with a large number o f sentences (Elman 1999). Elman used 10,000 sentences as input
data to his computer model. Although this may seem like an excessive amount of data,
infants actually hear far more than that in the months before they say their first words
(Kita and Dickey 1998). Infants between the ages o f six and nine months hear over
65,000 utterances, most of which are either fully or partially grammatically correct (Allen
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and Seidenberg 1999; Meisel 1995. There is also evidence that children who hear more
adult speech leam earlier and faster (Snow 1999; Fowler 1981). The more they hear, the
larger their vocabularies and the sooner they acquire grammar. Hence, there is enough
data available to children, most o f it is well formed, and there is evidence that they must
be using that data when they are beginning to leam words.
One argument thought to support the poverty o f stimulus argument comes from
Goldin-Meadow and Mylander (1993). They claim that deaf children raised in hearing
households can develop a grammatical gestural communication with minimal input.
They believe their study supports the theory that children come equipped with some sort
of innate predicate calculus. Their interpretation o f the data is that the spontaneous
gestures hearing parents use are enough to trigger the development of a grammar system.
Bates and Volterra (1984), however, point out that the input these children receive may
be richer than claimed or even realized by the researchers. The children that GoldinMeadow studied were not profoundly deaf and the most advanced children also tended to
be children with the most residual hearing. Mothers were sending “complex multimodal
messages” ^vith children getting signals from lip-reading, facial expression, sound,
gesture, and context. Psychologists have found that a pairing of two cues that are both
below the threshold o f perception can boost each other when they occur together (Payne
and Wenger 1998). The question is not “How are children inventing language?” but
rather “How are children taking a ‘mixed media’ message and converting it to gestural
output?” Bates and Volterra also point out that Goldin-Meadow and Mylander assume
that points are nouns and pantomimes are verbs and that this is not the same way as ASL
categorizes where points are treated as pronouns and pantomimes are part of nouns.
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Further, there were essentially no gains in grammar complexity across the duration of the
study. The grammar that was observed was very primitive, probably the result of input
that was not as impoverished as claimed, and it did not progress to a truly generative
grammar. Hence, it cannot be considered good support for the poverty of stimulus
argument.
There is also evidence that the input that children receive is specially structured to
get their attention and provides them with linguistic clues at a time when they are
beginning to notice vocal communication. Infant-directed speech (IDS) is different in
several ways from adult directed speech (ADS). It uses higher pitch, greater pitch
variability, shorter vocalizations, and longer pauses (Femald 1993; Hirsh-Pasek and
Golinkoff 1996). These differences hold cross-linguistically and may be biologically
relevant signals that have evolved to ensure survival (Femald 1993). IDS appears to be
sculpted to the child’s developmental level because its character changes as the child
develops. Werker et al. (1996) note that four-month old infants prefer infant-directed
speech to adult-directed speech and they prefer native to non-native speech. These
infants not only prefer IDS, they seem to require it to make sense out o f the speech
stream since their ability to discriminate between different phonemes depends on the
presence of IDS: By the time they are nineteen months old, children do equally well on
phoneme discrimination tests whether they hear IDS or ADS. IDS may help infants pick
out words as well as assisting in the development of syntax since they can detect phrase
boundaries only in IDS, not ADS. Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff (1996) report that their
preliminary attempts to study the effect of ADS on speech acquisition in infants indicate
that this kind of research may inevitably fail because very young children simply don’t
73

pay attention to it. Prelinguistic infants and children who are just beginning to produce
words require input that attracts their attention and primes them for their entry to
language.
3.1.3

Problems With Syntactic Bootstrapping
Syntactic bootstrapping (see Section 2.1.1) proposes that children come to

language knowing something about the structure o f sentences. They leam their own
grammar by setting certain parameters for grammatical principles. These parameters can
be set with a minimum o f input. The major problems with this theory concern how those
parameters could be correctly set with the tools that children have at the time they begin
to produce words and the timing o f the development of prototype concepts.
Syntactic bootstrapping claims that children can locate triggers in the input they
receive and set parameters for their grammar (see Section 2.1.1). Chomsky did not
specify how children identify the triggers in the input. If children can identify these
triggers, however, why can’t we just present them with the ones they need and have them
leam language immediately? Since there must be default parameters, some languages
should be easier to leam than others. In fact, children never leam language instantly or
even very quickly and all languages seem to be equally easy for children to acquire
(Meisel 1995; Slobin 1992; Pye 1990).^° Meisel (1995) questions how the theory might

That is not to say that all features of all languages are learned equally easily. For instance, a number
of investigators have noted that children learning English have some difficulty learning case distinctions of
English pronouns (James 1990; Goodluck 1991). Japanese children experience difficulty learning to use
accusative case markers on Japanese noun phrases. German marks case and gender on articles, adjectives,
and pronouns. German children leam to make the appropriate distinctions by age 2;2 on adjectives but
make errors with articles as late at 5;6. German children over-generalize the nominative form of the
articles to objects. Polish children begin to acquire case marking on nouns as early as 1;7 and quickly
develop the markers for nominative, accusative, and genitive. Turkish nouns are acquired early and
children use the accusative case marker productively by age 2;0 (Pye 1990).
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allow for parameters to be reset if they are initially wrong. Meisel surveyed data from
American children and their parents that showed four percent of parental replies were
ungrammatical and sixteen percent were acceptable but not fully grammatical. The
notion o f triggering imphes that, in principle, an extremely small number o f examples
should suffice to set parameters. In principle, twenty percent or even four percent
ungrammatical sentences are likely to make the task impossible because the child has no
way o f knowing whether a given sentence is ungrammatical or whether the parser needs
to be adjusted.
Several researchers have found that children can leam new verbs by using
syntactic frames (Gleitman 1993; Goldberg 2000; Goldberg 1999). Goldberg (1999;
2000) has shown that speech to children contains certain basic templates that children can
use to infer the meanings o f novel verbs. Syntactic frames can be shown to drive
vocabulary acquisition as early as 20 months (MacWhinney 1998). However, this
research has been unable to demonstrate that very young children use an innate
knowledge o f structure to leam their first words. The problem that this thesis addresses is
the question of how children acquire their very first words, not how they acquire
additional vocabulary once they know grammar. Children who are learning their very
first words are neither semantically nor syntactically precocious. They do not parse,
analyze, or understand reality, and they are notoriously conservative in their use of novel
structures. Once they have progressed beyond the single-word stage, syntactic
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bootstrapping can help children quickly acquire new words and grammar but this is
probably not how children leam their first words (Snow 1999; Bloom 1993)?'
3.1.4

Problems With Semantic Bootstrapping
Semantic bootstrapping theory differs fi-om syntactic bootstrapping in that

children are seen as innately constrained to make certain kinds of guesses about word
meanings and they can get these meanings from context. They listen to the words used to
describe things in the world and try to figure out their meanings by observing the
associated situation (Pinker 1994). If a child figures out the meanings o f the words,
figuring out syntactic structure becomes easier —the child can use what is known about
meaning to induce syntactic fi-ames (Pinker 1994; Snow 1999). Semantic bootstrapping
theory predicts that children produce words when they understand what they mean.
Hence, for these theorists, word production is equated with language acquisition.
The kind of reasoning that allows a person to guess word meanings fi*om a few
specific examples is called inductive reasoning. Children, says Pinker (1994), are able to
induce word meanings because they are innately predisposed to make certain kinds of
guesses. One of these kinds of guesses is that a word said in the presence of an object
will be the name o f that object rather than one of an infinite number of alternatives."^
The main problem with this theory is that infants are not particularly good at
inductive reasoning (Snow 1999). For children to use semantic bootstrapping, they
would need to understand what is going on in the world. But they usually leam about the

Word learning is not equated in this paper with language learning or language acquisition. See also
Section 1.3.5.
For example, if a child hears the word rabbit while watching a rabbit running, alternatives might include
such ideas as “scurrying rabbit,” “scurrying thing,” “undetached rabbit parts,” etc. (Pinker 1994).
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world through language rather than learning about language through their knowledge of
the world. Further, speech to children is often simplified but not limited to canonical
descriptions of prototypical scenes (Bowerman 1993). There is, in fact, evidence that
children can’t use semantic bootstrapping to leam the meanings of aU words.
For example, Gleitman (1993) argues that children cannot leam the meanings of
even simple verbs by attending to the context o f use because there is both too much
information and not enough information to leam meanings. She focuses on verb learning
because it is in this area that it becomes clear that the observer who notices everything
about a situation can leam nothing. There is no end to the number o f ways a situation
could be described. However, even blind children, who cannot use visual observation,
leam subtle differences in the meanings of look, watch, and see. Further, many verbs are
only remotely related to the observable world. Gleitman suggests that words such as
think, guess, wonder, and know cannot be leamed by observation and, hence, must be
acquired fi"om clausal syntax. Gleitman’s argument leaves us with the conclusion that if
children were to attach meaning to words at the time they first produce them the way
semantic bootstrapping claims, they would not be able to do so for all word meanings
without some additional cues.
3.1.5

Is Language an Instinct?
Pinker (1994) has said that language acquisition acts like an instinct. It is no more

related to culture than standing upright. Further, he says that it bears all the hallmarks of
an instinct because it is a complex skill, acquired without instruction, and is the same in
every individual. He says it is acquired much like birds leam their songs and that there is
a critical or sensitive period when they must be exposed to input for them to acquire it. I
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suggest that Pinker is wrong. While it is certainly a complex skill, language is also
intricately related to culture and social expectations (Bate 1979, 1995; Hurford 2000;
Snow 1999; Vygotsky in Rieber and Carton 1987; Deacon 1997; Grieve and Hoogenrad
1986; Boysson-Bardies 1999; Ochs and Shiefifelin 1995). Language also does not
compare well to birdsong. There are great differences among birds’ needs for learning.
Some birds can sing their songs without any input at all while others must hear their
species’ songs during a critical period in their life or they can sing only a very primitive
kind o f song (Marier 1993). Assigning language the status o f an instinct means that
children must leam language this way during a narrow window of time.
While they do leam a lot in the first 2 or 3 years of life, children still have much
to leam (Bloom 1993). James (1990) reports that significant language learning normally
occurs even after the age of 5. Moeser (1977) specifically challenged the notion that
children have special language-processing abilities that are lost by puberty. Her studies
with mini-languages show adults can leam to use languages as well or better than
children.^^ It appears that, whether children break into language through some kind of
bootstrapping or not, whether they have pre-programmed language knowledge or not, it is
unlikely that language acquisition is the result of an instinct. In the discussion of infant
development (see Section 1.5), we saw that children vary widely in their cognitive
development, word learning, and even language acquisition and, while language is a

Miniature artificial languages allow the experimenter to simplify the task of studying language
acquisition by restricting the number of variables in the experiment. These languages consist of a symbolic
system, a rule system, and referential system corresponding to the phonological, syntactic, and semantic
components of natural language. Each component, however, is less complex than in natural language and,
hence, easier to analyze. Investigators assume their findings are relevant to language acquisition and use
because the psychological processes they study, such as word order, rule systems, and the acquisition of
syntactic code, are equivalent to the processes involved in natural language (Moeser 1977).
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complex skill, it is not subject to the same kind of critical period restrictions as the
acquisition o f birdsong.
3.1.6

Innate Prototypes?
Nativists claim that children have innate prototypes and concepts that they link to

new words (Pinker 1987). In an earlier discussion on prototype development (see Section
2.2.1), computer modeling showed that prototypes are not necessarily innate but may
emerge after a word can be produced rather than before. Gopnik and Meltzofif (1993)
focus on assessing cognitive development and correlating it with linguistic development.
They find that, although children as young as nine months appear to have some early
understanding of categories and can identify named objects, only children who have
experienced what they call the naming spurt are able to sort objects into groups. Further,
they found cognitive diSerences between children learning English and children learning
Korean. Korean mothers use more verbs when they speak to their children which,
Gopnik and Meltzof conclude, accounts for the fact that Korean children have more verbs
in their early vocabularies and may experience a verb spurt before a naming spurt if, in
fact, they have a naming spurt at all. They conclude that since English-speaking children
leam more names of things at an earlier age, they develop the ability to sort by categories
earlier than Korean children. What children hear apparently influences what they say
but, more importantly for concept development, what they say influences how their
cognitive abilities develop.
Semantic bootstrapping theory suggests that children are able to untangle syntax
fi-om the meanings o f words. But this would require that 1) children leam words in
sentential context and 2) when they do leam words, these words fill grammatical
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categories for which children have innate concepts. There is evidence that neither of
these requirements is satisfied when children first begin to produce words. Ninio (1992)
collected data fi-om 48 mothers and 24 children who averaged 18 months of age. He
recorded the utterances o f both mothers and infants and found a direct correlation
between the single word utterances of the mothers and the vocabularies of the children.
In other words, the single words the children spoke were apt to reflect the single-word
utterances o f the mothers. While both mothers and infants spoke these words in
situations where there was shared attention to named objects, there was no sentential
context. Barrett (1995) also studied infants’ early single-word production. He found that
the context of their use indicates that, at the beginning of lexical development, children
do not group words into grammatical categories in the way the words later function m the
children’s grammar. Griffiths (1986; 1979) says that first words may be holophrases not words, as we understand them, but word-sentences. Words cannot initially fill
grammatical categories because, when first acquired, they are proto-sentences that are
just one proto-word long. Children produce early words in the absence of sentential
context and these words do not necessarily define grammatical categories. Hence, innate
prototypes must not be necessary for children to begin learning words.
3.1.7

Summary o f Nativist Theories
Bootstrapping theories place a heavy requirement on children’s early abilities in

order to account for how they first begin to leam words. Snow (1999) concludes that
infants are neither semantically nor syntactically precocious and can’t use semantic
bootstrapping or syntactic bootstrapping to begin producing words. There is not enough
information storage in DNA to account for what nativists credit children with knowing.
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Language learning does not compare well to instincts because humans are not limited to
learning language during a critical period o f time and children do not seem to leam
language as quickly and easily and with as little input as once assumed. In fact, children
work hard at learning language and they probably require a very large amount of input
over a long period o f time.
3.2 Emergentism and the Problems with the Computer Models
In recent years, a number o f researchers have developed the theory that language
emerges from the interaction of small differences in non-specific abilities. This idea has
been supported by the development o f a number of computer models designed to mimic
the acquisition o f certain language features in children. Although promising, these
models and the ideas behind them suffer from problems o f their own. Among them is the
continuing argument that without innate constraints, children would have too much
information to be able to decide how to attach meaning to a referent. There are also
specific problems with the way the models work. One o f these problems has to do with
causality and the other is the lack o f sufficiency of explanation by the models. Computer
models ignore social and emotional factors that will be seen to be of critical importance
in the acquisition o f first words.
3.2.1

The Causality Problem
Throughout the discussion o f how children leam their language, the different

explanations have omitted one critical and important issue. Why do children talk? What
causes word production to begin? The most cleverly designed computer program cannot
answer this important question. Bates et al. (1979) describe the four kinds o f Aristotelian
causality and their importance to language acquisition. Efficient causality is the '‘push81

from-behind” kind that can explain why a book fell off the table. Natural selection is
considered an efficient cause o f evolution. Behaviorist psychology seeks efficient
explanations o f behavior. Bates does not believe that any efficient cause is sufficient to
“push” symbolic communication into existence.
Material causation —the presence o f material conditions necessary for something
to occur - is also not sufficient to explain how language develops. Having flour, eggs,
and water available does not make a cake happen. Similarly, having the physical
equipment to produce language does not make language happen.
Final causation is the “puU-from-the-front” kind of cause. Desire to reach goals
can be a form of causation as in the operant conditioning experiment where a rat expects
to get food when it pushes a lever. Computer programs are subject to a kind o f final
causation when they are programmed to run until a final goal or answer is achieved.
The last kind o f causality is formal —the laws governing the range of possible
outcomes in a given situation provides the structure or form required. For example, the
laws o f physics combine to cause a rock to fall in a given place when it has been thrown.
The amount o f stirring required and effects o f heat limit how a cake may be baked.
Language learning may require all four kinds of causality and we know that
computer models do not provide them in the ways that a child’s brain and the world do.
The programmer has too much control over the program to be certain that the answers he
gets represent human language and the way that it is acquired. We do not know enough
about brains, children, and computers to be able to assume that what causes word
production to begin in a model is the same in a model as it is for a child.
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3.2.2

Are Neural Networks a Satisfactory Solution?
The connectionist models presented in Section 2.2 are very good at categorization

but have difficulty predicting other forms o f behavior, including social and emotional
behavior. Since the system does not record what items have been presented, one cannot
predict performance. No matter how good computer models might be at categorization,
there are empty categories that children seem to know about. Computer models have not
yet been able to explain how things that are absent in the surface structures of sentences
could be acquired at an abstract level (Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff] 996). Simple
connectionist models can only leam categories that are linearly separable. Models with
hidden nodes can solve more complex categorization problems but they can only leam
word meanings when the words are presented at the same time as the referent. Hence,
while they can model learning, it may not be the way that children leam since children
attend to the object the adult is talking about only 30 percent to 50 percent o f the time
(Bloom 2000). Also, the models are so flexible that minor alterations in their design can
cause major differences in behavior (Payne and Wenger 1998). If the addition of one
node to the model makes it possible for the model to categorize in ways that the previous
model couldn’t, was the previous model a feilure? Is the new model really a new model?
If two different models behave the same way, how can the programmer know which one
is better? These questions point out that a serious problem with computer models is that
they may be able to leam words but may not represent how children leam words.
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Pinker and Prince (1988) and Pinker (1993) criticize the Rumelhart and
McClelland connectionist model of the acquisition of English past tense^'* by pointing out
serious general problems with the neural network computer model and its abilities to
explain language acquisition. The model was unable to represent certain words, it had a
tendency to leam rules that no human language contains, and it was unable to explain
morphological and phonological regularities. Pinker concludes that the model actually
failed in its task because it gave an incorrect explanation for some developmental
phenomena and gave accounts of others that were indistinguishable from rules. Pinker
argues that the model mimicked the classic U-shaped learning curve only because of
unrealistic assumptions about the input. He says that children do not overregularize
based on any properties of the input - rather they overregularize when they leam the
regular mle. Further, the model did not actually produce words or even phonemes, but
only the features that the answers would contain. There was also no attempt to relate
these answers with lexical features. Pinker and Prince (1988) and Pinker (1994) argue
that a past-tense mle must apply to a verb stem stored in the lexicon, not just a set of
phonemes. Hence, the model could never differentiate between such words as break and
brake or between wring and ring. Further, the model treated both regular and irregular
verbs qualitatively the same way, which is not how they occur in the language. Pinker
notes that when verbs are formed from words of other parts o f speech, they are subject to

Rumelhart and McClelland ( 1993) designed a model that translated words into phonetic features and then
predicted what phonetic features the past tense would contain. Presented with a small number of irregular
verbs, the model quickly leamed to produce the phonetic features of a correct past tense. When they added
a large number of regular verbs to the input, the model first made more mistakes and then gradually leamed
to produce mostly correct answers for both regular and irregular verbs. The model also produced answers
such as membled for the past of mail and squawked for the past tense of squat.
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the rules for regular stems regardless o f their sound. Computer models are powerful
learners but this is more a liability than an advantage. If computers are to correctly
model human learning, they must account for the constraints and rules that human
learners appear to have.
Neural networks have been used with success in the modeling of many specific
individual linguistic processes and many researchers now agree that they represent part of
the answer to language acquisition questions. For instance, in the case of past tense
learning, there may be two processes involved, the acquisition of a regular past tense rule
and the learning of irregulars by associative memory (Pinker and Prince 1988; Pinker
1994). However, computer models suffer fi*om a number of technical and theoretical
problems. All o f them involve the fact that, while they can mimic small parts and
properties of human learning, they are not human and are either too powerful or not
powerful enough to account for language acquisition. Redington and Chater (1997)
discuss this problem and conclude that there must be many sources of information
involved. They have suggested that a combination of different kinds of models hold
promise for future research but it is currently impossible to achieve a human level of
performance with any single computer model.^^ Language may emerge firom domaingeneral processes as the models suggest, but it has not yet proven that they can explain
everything about early word production.

Other models include probabilistic models that use statistical properties of language and distributional
models based on relationships between linguistic units (Redington and Chater 1997).
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3.3 Is There an Alternative Solution?
In the discussion on synthesis solutions in Section 2.3.3,1 showed that some
researchers believe the differences between these theories may be collapsed (Hirsh-Pasek
and Golinkoff 1996). These theories can be arranged on a continuum and none of them
are completely opposed to the ideas of the others. There is more agreement between the
sides than is first apparent.
First, everyone agrees that there is something special about humans that must be
present when word production begins (Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff 1996). The child must
have some kind o f sensitivity to input information and be able to arrange that
informatioa Nativists focus on innate knowledge, and emergentists suggest that general
processes allow children to pick out words, associate them with a context, and begin to
produce them.
Second, there must be something that drives the process forward. Hirsh-Pasek
and Golinkoff (1996) propose that there is no single impetus that causes language to be
acquired but rather a large number of things that encourage children to leam words.
These include environmental events, social interaction, prosody, and syntactic patterns.
They suggest that children ‘‘live in a benevolent world in which these input sources
CO

vary reliably with one another.” Word production is not only affected by many things

in the child’s world but actually depends on the predictable presence o f all of them in
varying degrees at specific times.
3.3.1

Problems With the Current Synthesis Proposal
There are several problems with the synthesis as currently proposed. First, the

suggestion that there is something special about humans because they leam language is
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not an answer. The question is not whether there is something special about humans, but
what it is that is special. Here, the nativists and emergentists disagree substantially.
Nativists claim that evolution resulted in special language-processing mental structures
that encode language knowledge, including the appropriate mechanisms to find
meaningful units in the speech stream. Emergentists claim that small differences in
general human mental processes work together to create something that did not
previously exist. Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff have not reconciled this difference in
theoretical view and, in fact, they reveal that they side with the nativists when they say,
“Our opinion is aligned with a kind of process-oriented, inside-out view in which
children come to the learning task with some sensitivities to properties in the input that
are informed by internal grammatical k n o w l e d g e . T h e y claim that both the
“something” that is present when word production begins and the mechanism that allows
children to bootstrap into language must be answered by the nativist stance. For them, a
synthesis solution needs a domain-specific module with buüt-in language knowledge.
Finally, they argue that a well-timed coalition of environmental factors drives the
process forward. They propose that children are sensitive to a range o f environmental

'‘Inside-out” theories are the nativist viewpoint - those theories that contend language is the result of a
domain-specific language module in the brain and that there is hard-wired, innate knowledge about
language in a child’s brain. This is contrasted with “outside-in” theories - those that claim language
structure is in the environment. These theories claim children construct language fi-om general cognitive
and social processes.
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inputs that, presented in the proper sequence,^^ drive the process forward once it gets
started, but they don’t explain why children leam their very first words.
3.3.2

Other Possible Syntheses
While there are other synthesis theories that attempt to provide answers to the

question of how children acquire language, they start fi-om the point at which word
meanings have already been acquired and then attempt to answer the question of how
grammar arises. Elman et al. (1996) argue that human brains evolved to be able to solve
problems and language is one of them. They believe that children are bom with the
general processing tools and a drive to solve the language problem. The grammar they
develop is the result of a natural solution. Pinker’s (1987) Constraint Satisfaction model
is a similar explanation but with a nativist view. He agrees that language is a problem
that children find a natural solution for, but believes that children need innate constraints
in order to solve it. Pinker’s argument assumes children have innate prototypes for word
categories that they match to input representations as words are leamed. Emergentist
theory holds that prototypes develop after words begin to be leamed. Pinker and Prince
(1988) allow that a connectionist model might be able to answer some kinds of language
acquisition questions but maintain that symbolic rule-based learning will always be
necessary to explain grammar. While these alternative ideas suggest that some kind of
synthetic theory might answer language acquisition questions, they do not appear to

For example, they claim that the infant is especially sensitive to the basic units of language (words,
phrases, clauses) and to basic relations such as agency and location and that the environment provides these
things at the right time and in the right order.
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address the primary problem o f this thesis, which is how and why first words are
produced and what they represent to the child.
3.4 Summary of Current Views and Their Weaknesses
In summary, nativist theories say that children leam too much too quickly to be
accounted for by the input they receive. What is missing is attributed to innate
knowledge and this has been called Universal Grammar. What UG actually consists of
has been the subject of much debate with claims ranging fi’om built-in rules for grammar
to simple skeletal limits on what can be leamed. On the other hand, emergentists believe
that the input children receive is sufficient to account for early word production.
Computer models have shown that at least some o f the constraints necessary may be
contained in the input. However, computer models do not explain what motivates
children to leam to say words in the first place. Synthesis arguments that propose to take
the best of both sides invariably either fall back on innate knowledge or assume the child
can somehow get the process started without explaining how.
3.5 An Alternative
Do we know enough about genetics and children to be able to develop a theory of
language acquisition that does not collapse into either a nativist theory or a connectionist
model? I propose to look at how a child develops cognitively during the time when first
words appear and relate that understanding to what we know about the evolution of our
species and o f language, borrowing some ideas firom the fields of psychology and
anthropology to develop an argument that will include innate social precocity and
emergentist ideas. I will look at how cognitive development interacts with general
attention-getting mechanisms leading to early word production and the importance of
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social interaction in this process. We will find that certain kinds of cognitive
development are prerequisites to language and may be innate but others emerge only after
first words are produced. Researchers generally agree that older children can use both
syntactic and semantic bootstrapping processes to acquire additional vocabulary and
grammar, but first words are leamed through domain-general processes and are neither
tied to a specific referent nor are they the result of an innate search for object labels.
Certain innate but general cognitive skills and innate social skills provide the ability and
motivation to produce first words.
3.5.1

Cognitive and Social Development in the Pre-Linguistic Infant
What occurs before the infant can begin to talk? In addition to generally

acknowledged physical maturation, it appears that certain kinds o f cognitive development
must occur. I am claiming, however, that the cognitive skills necessary for children to
leam to produce words emerge fi"om general processes that work together. An infant
must first be able to pick out significant chunks fi*om the speech stream in the
environment and must be motivated to do so. There is evidence that the ability to
segment words arises fi-om general mechanisms, and that innate social skills of humans
motivate parents and infants to communicate with each other.
What we know about the segmentation of the speech stream indicates that an
infant needs and uses several different kinds of clues to pick out meaningful units. As
discussed in Section 2.2, it is not just one feature of language, rather a multitude of clues
combine to give children the tools to pick out salient parts of the speech stream by the
time they are ready to begin producing their own words. What drives this process,
however, is the infant’s developing cognitive abilities and need for social interaction.
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Lock (1997) speculated on the relationship between the cognitive development of
infants and the acquisition of language and suggested that the newborn’s world is
primarily child-centered. A very young infant cries because of discomfort of some sort
and wants that discomfort to go away. Very quickly, the infant begins to focus on events,
objects, and people in the outside world and learns that an action achieves a goal, it can
be used as a tool to achieve that goal again. In addition, both the infant and the caregiver
are willing participants in a social game that has evolved because it results in better
survival (Femald 1993). The mother is genetically programmed to ensure species
survival and is willing to expend energy to get an infant’s attention with sounds as weU as
physical interaction. The infant pays attention, not only to get fed, but also to get the
kind of social interaction needed to thrive. This includes certain kinds of game playing
that has verbal content. In Sections 2.2.2 and 3.1.2,1 discussed evidence that shows the
speech o f adults to infants is generally different from speech to adults in acoustic content
and meaning, and is effective in establishing emotional communication (Femald 1993).
An infant is predisposed to interact with others from birth (Grieve and Hoogenraad
1986). The child’s world is a social world and mother is usually a constant social
companion. Only in institutions is the child likely to be isolated from social constancy
and stability, and it is a common observation that linguistic development is slower when
otherwise normal children are institutionalized. Bates et al. (1979) find that the way
mothers interact with their children has an impact on cognitive development and,
ultimately, language development. The beginnings of communicative behavior lie in
early infancy.
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Researchers in other fields have also suggested that it is social factors that prepare
the infant for entry into the world o f language. Anthropologist Robin Dunbar ( 1996)
links social communication to the evolution of the human species. He points out that
humans have evolved the largest and most complex social groups of any species. His
research shows that social group size is correlated with brain complexity. Our ancestors,
like most primates, undoubtedly used grooming to maintain social bonds. Grooming
works well in small groups but the amount of time required makes it impractical as a
means of social communication in groups o f more than around fifty individuals. Dunbar
claims that larger groups require both an efficient means of communication between
members and a brain that can keep track of many complex layers of social interaction.
He suggests that language provided the kind o f communication necessary to maintain the
large social groups that humans participate in. Hence, says Dunbar, language capacity
evolved initially as a form of social communication.
Studying the evolution of language, Hurford (2000) designed a computer model
that simulated the sharing of language in social settings. Hurford claims that social
transmission is required for passing language fi*om one generation to the next whether or
not grammar is assumed to be innate. His simulations go through a “one-word” stage of
communication with no grammar rules, only lexical items. One version o f his model
assumed that categories such as subject and predicate are understood (pre-programmed)
at the time single words were learned and one version assumed that first words are whole
propositions. That is, word classes develop after word acquisition from analysis of
propositions. Both models succeed in developing language rules. These models point
out that language rules can emerge either if they are innate or from analysis o f input. The
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models also spotlight one of the difficulties with computer modeling. If both versions of
the model work, is one better than the other? Or whether, as Hurford suggests, both
processes are somehow involved, along with the social interaction that, he stresses, is
required in either case.
Very young infants are weak and defenseless when compared to infants of other
species. The main strength and survival tool that human infants have is their talent for
social interaction. Even newborns prefer to look at adult faces and listen speech-like
stimuli (Snow 1999). Snow reports that they can make eye contact and use smiling,
quieting, and their own facial expressions to make and keep their parents’ attention.
Infants maintain joint attention with caretakers through gestures and context-embedded
games and routines (Snow 1981). Cross-linguistic studies show that there are may be an
instinctive way of speaking that gets their attention (Femald 1993). They respond to the
affective features o f prosody when their caregivers talk to them using infant directed
speech (Femald 1993; Snow 1986; Thoman 1981). Non-verbal communication is
important m the development of affective communication. For instance, smiles can
communicate affect to the mother. Facial expressions are not random but occur in
predictable patterns that mothers look for and assign meaning to. Mother-infant non
verbal communication, while necessary to survival, is not directly analogous to language
but Thoman’s research shows that successful affective communication correlates with
cognitive development and later linguistic success.
Humans have evolved complex social groups and a need for social interaction.
Infants are genetically programmed to respond to their mothers’ vocalizations. They pay
attention to and respond to these vocalizations. They enjoy and participate in social93

oriented games and routines. This kind of social interaction reinforces learning and
cognitive development and prepares them for later acquisition o f language by allowing
them to practice vocal and social skills that precede word production. Most importantly
for the beginnings of language, infants are predisposed to attend to and attempt to
participate in various kinds of social communication with their caregivers.
3.5.2

Cognitive Prerequisites for Word Production
No chüd is bom with the ability to speak. Language is neither physically nor

cognitively possible for the very young infant (Lieberman 1999; Lock 1997). Spoken
language is physically impossible for the newborn because the vocal tract length must
mature. Language is not cognitively possible until the chüd recognizes that people and
objects can act on each other. Snow (1999) and Bates et al. (1979) propose that it is this
cognitive and physical development that provides the already sociaUy precocious infant
with the tools for language. The cognitive capacities that have been identified as
essential for chüdren to begin speaking are tool use, imitation, and means-ends abilities
(Bates et al. 1979; Uzgiris 1981). These general cognitive abilities appear to be
necessary for chÜdren to be able to use words.
For example. Bates’ et al. (1979) studies of cognitive development and language
skills in a group o f chüdren between the ages of nine and twelve months showed that tool
use, imitation, and means-ends abilities at nine months are correlated with word use at
twelve months. Bates discovered that not aU cognitive abilities are correlated with
language. Object permanence and spatial measures do not predict later word production.
However, means-ends abilities, imitation and symbolic play activities do presage later
word learning.
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There is also a correlation between means-ends task solution and attachment style,
tying cognitive development to social interaction (Bates et al. 1979). Infants who are
either not well attached to their mothers or overly dependent on them fare poorly in
cognitive tests o f means-ends abilities. Infants who have a secure relationship with their
mothers are more successful on such cognitive tests. Since Bates et al. also show
correlations between attachment style and gestural communication, and between gestural
communication and lai^uage development, there must be an important relationship
between mother-infant interaction and language development. Infants who have secure
social relationships develop cognitive skills better and, subsequently, begin to speak
earlier than infants who have poor interactions with their mothers.
This research shows that there are cognitive links between socialization and
certain kinds of cognitive development (Bates et al. 1979). These cognitive skills —
imitation, means-end abilities, and tool use abilities - can predict later word production.
Before infants can speak, they must notice how they relate to their world learn that they
can affect it. They care about their relationship to their caregivers because they are
basically social beings and they actively work to find their role in this social arena. Their
world-view is changing and it includes the people and things around them.
3.5.3

First Word Productions
At the time that infants learn they can control peoples’ actions, they have already

been practicing and doing it unconsciously for a long time. Bates et al. (1975) suggest
that eye contact, gestures, and prelinguistic vocalizations have a systematic effect on
caregivers without the conscious intent of the child. The next step is the use of these
means to purposely control that effect. Finally, the child utters sounds that have the same
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purpose and effect as the earlier nonverbal actions. The questions that have not yet been
answered include how the infant decides what sounds to produce and what meanings they
may have.
We know that infants have learned to use a range of cues to pick out sound units
from the speech stream and they have been babbling and practicing the sounds of their
language. Eleven-month old infants prefer to listen to speech that is interrupted at word
boundaries rather than at random spots in a stream of speech. This does not imply they
understand the meanings o f the words. Anything in the environment that is repeated,
however, can acquire significance. Children are exquisitely sensitive to repeated
sound/event sequences and can pick out repeated sounds and associate them with
repeated events (McDonald 1997).
Furthermore, children have been learning how they relate to their social
environment and they have learned that what they do affects the people around them. It
is natural, then, to expect that the child’s first use o f words will be to elaborate further the
process of regulation and structuring of social interaction with mother and others (Grieve
and Hoogenraad 1986). First word productions are highly idiosyncratic and variable
across children (Fenson et al. 1994; de Boysson-Bardies 1999; Boysson-Bardies and
Vihman unpublished paper; Bates et al. 1995; see also Section 1.5). Early word
productions have significance to the infant that may not be readily apparent to an
observer. They may have no referential meaning to the child. Whether children
eventually develop generative grammar from a domain-specific language module that is
already present in the brain or language-specificity emerges from domain-general
abilities, the kind of word meaning that is associated with language must arise later from
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use, environment, social interaction, and short-term memory development, and it is
gradual. Computer simulations in artificial neural networks have suggested that this kind
of meaning may emerge (Redington and Chater 1997; Gupta and Dell 1999) while
nativists have made strong arguments that there are innate features that suggest certain
kinds o f linguistic knowledge are present in the mind of the child (Cook and Newson
1996; Pinker 1994; 1993; 1987). When the sounds that children make during babbling
begin to acquire the phonology and prosody of the language spoken around them,
mothers begin searching for meaningful words in the sounds their infants make. At some
point, infants say things that sound like words. Mothers accept these sounds as first
words and respond to them as if they were meaningful, especially when the child repeats
them in appropriate settings. There is a great deal of evidence indicating that, before
infants begin to speak, they are accustomed to interacting with their parents in contingent
response patterns (Snow 1995; 1981) so that when they begin to use word-like sounds,
they are already able to use the responses that they receive to strengthen their use of the
sounds in appropriate contexts. First word productions, then, reflect an extension of
social interaction routines with caregivers, not the linguistic import o f the words
themselves. Mothers’ interpretations o f these productions and subsequent response to
them may help reinforce the associations that infants make between the form and the
context.
While first words may seem appropriate in a given situation, the child is still
experimenting and has learned to pair sounds with a situation but not with a concept
(Capirci et al. 1996). Early word production happens in a setting that is both social and
reinforcing. Actual concept formation develops gradually and is not dependent on an
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innate prototype. Even if words appear to have a referent, the first uses of those words
are invariably are context-bound - associated with some highly specific behavioral event
in the child’s social world (Barrett 1986; Harris et al. 1988).^* There are a few
documented cases where infants seem to be using words in a referential sense even when
they are used for the very first time (Harris et al. 1988; Bates et al. 1979). However, even
in these cases, the non-verbal context at the time the mother used a word could be linked
to the child’s use o f that word (Harris et al. 1988). In other words, whether early words
are clearly context-bound or appear to have a referent, they are linked to the mother’s use
of them in a particular situation.^^
While they expected to find a complex o f factors affecting early word use, Harris
et al. (1998) find that their data points to a single relatively simple fector —frequency of
use by the mother. Some early word productions might seem to be referential but are
usually initially used in only one context, that being the one in which the mother uses the
word most fi*equently. Further, at least in some cases, the child uses a particular word
because it is used in a context to which the child is particularly responsive. Both the
child and the mother, through fi*equent repetition and familiarity with certain routines,
jointly influence which words became salient. Hence, Harris et al. conclude that first
words are produced because they are used often by a caregiver, have emotional salience

For example, initial use of dt^ck was only while hitting toys ducks of the bathtub (Barrett 1986); initial
use of car was only while looking at a car moving on the street (Bloom 1973); initial use of catch was only
while throwing a ball to another person (Barrett 1986).
Harris defines context-bound words as those used only in one highly specific behavioral context.
Referential words are those not tied to a context but used in at least two different contexts (Harris et al.
1988). See also Section 1.3.6.
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for the child, and that these words are probably context-dependent whether or not they
appear to have a referent.
This paper proposes that early word productions are acquired as part of a meansends game and this works because children are socially precocious. First words are not
the result o f an innate search for object labels but the result o f a desire to participate in a
social game that has evolved to meet the needs o f the species. The earliest vocabulary
can be anything at aU. The composition of children’s very early vocabularies should not
be predictable because children do not recognize categories o f words, only that sound
units can associate with certain situations in the world that they wish to participate in.
3.6 Summary of the Alternative Account o f First Words
Nativist claims that input is not important and is usually ill formed are wrong
(Snow 1981 ; 1999). Observed speech to children is usually simpler and more
grammatical than adult-to-adult speech and it is abundant. Children ignore complex
speech and only attend to what they can understand. They readily participate in social
situations. By the time they produce their first words, infants are adept at social
communication. They already understand feedback, how to pay attention, and how to get
someone’s attention. They first say words for the purpose o f participating in social
interaction. Social games lay the foundations necessary for later language learning.
Humans are highly motivated to be social, to learn culture, and to “fit in.” There is a
strong pressure to gain group membership and approval. The establishment and
maintenance of social identity is an essential human need (Dunbar 1997). Words are
children’s entry tickets to an exclusive club.
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None of the current theories addresses all these issues - not even ‘synthesis’
theories. Here I have tried to develop an alternative theory —that the unique innate
features in human brains that help children begin the process by learning words are the
result o f the specialized architecture of human brains and the social nature o f the species.
There are certain features of language learning that can be successfully modeled by
computer programs but children need social interaction to develop necessary cognitive
skills. It is in the area of social interaction that children are especially precocious and
innately predisposed to respond and say words. Children’s first words are probably not
referential and are not initially linked to categories or concepts but are learned because
they are a successful way to interact and communicate with their caregivers.
My theory claims that children’s first words do not represent innately
programmed categories as has been suggested by nativists. I believe that the variability
noted in early vocabularies (Fenson et al. 1994; de Boysson-Bardies 1999; BoyssonBardies and Vihman unpublished paper; Bates et al. 1995; see also Section 1.5) is
significant because it provides evidence that first word productions are not predictable
and that children are not innately predisposed to look for object categories nor are there
innate linkages between words and categories as claimed by Waxman (1994). My theory
predicts that an examination of children’s very early vocabularies will reveal that their
content is so variable as to be considered random. Further, the evidence suggests that
first words are the result o f social interaction and that they become meaningful language
gradually as children acquire larger vocabularies.
In the following chapter, I report the results o f a study investigating the statistical
nature o f children’s very early words. The vocabularies of 29 children knowing ten
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words or fewer and the vocabularies of 17 children knowing between 10 and 44 words
were collected. A procedure for sorting the vocabularies into word-types was developed
and the data statistically analyzed for deviations from averages to determine whether
there were predictable patterns in these data sets. The results provide evidence that initial
word production is not the result of a search for object labels. Rather first words are
sounds that children hear often in particular contexts and learn to use for social
interaction.
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Chapter 4
A Statistical Analysis of Children’s First Words

4.0 What the Study Tests
The main claims of this thesis are that children are not seeking to link innate
categories to object labels when they first begin to leam words but that, instead, they
leam their first words because they are seeking social interaction and these first words are
those sounds that occur fi*equently in situations of social or emotional interest to them.
This thesis makes two separable claims. The first is that, contrary to the claims of some
nativist researchers (Pinker 1987; Markman 1993; Waxman 1994; Waxman and
Kosowski 1990), children are not innately predisposed to link innate prototypes to word
when they start to say words —specifically they are not innately looking for whole object
labels. The second is that children begin to talk for social and emotional reasons.
Although some researchers have shown that children as young as two years old appear to
be able to use their knowledge of categories to help leam the meanings of novel nouns
(Waxman 1994), these studies start late in the word learning process, at a time when
words already have linguistic meaning. Hence, they do not accurately portray what
happens when children produce their very first words. The present study is designed to
test the first part o f the thesis - to determine whether the very early lexicons of infants
will reveal categorical patterns that indicate that they are searching for object labels or
whether there is so much individual variation that no prediction can be made regarding
what children’s first words represent.
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4.1 Method
4.1.1

Subjects and Data Collection
Twenty-five subjects were normally developing American infants living in

monolingual English speaking households in Kalispell, Montana. KalispeU is a small
community in Northwest Montana. Since the population is not large, any normal infants
with vocabularies in the appropriate range whose parents were willing to participate were
accepted. Four o f the mothers were teenagers attending high school. These mothers
were interviewed in person. Data samples were collected by having the mothers fill out a
questionnaire in the presence o f the interviewer. The remaining twenty-one subjects
were children attending a local church day-care. These mothers were interviewed by
telephone. The ages of the infants in KahspeU ranged fi*om 8 to 23 months. Unless the
parents had actually recorded and dated their children’s earlier productions, data was only
accepted if the children were producing the words at the time of the study. That is,
unrecorded memories o f earlier productions were not acceptable. Although it can be
argued that mothers are not reliable sources for this information (Darly and Wintz 1961),
Fenson (2000) showed that parent inventories are at least as reliable as observations made
by trained researchers. Parent reports correlate well with observation and are internally
consistent.
Additional data were taken fi*om several published studies. Twelve data sets were
fi*om a study conducted by Vihman (1996). These subjects were normally developing
infants between the ages o f 10 and 16 months fi*om three diSerent cultural backgrounds.
The four American sets (infants aged 10-16 months) were collected at Stanford
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University, four French sets (infants aged 10-14 months) were collected in Paris, and four
English sets (infants aged 10-16 months) were collected at Rutgers University in
England. The data were drawn from videotaped half-hour unstructured play sessions
with the mother, collected bi-weekly or monthly in the children’s homes. Data published
by de Boysson-Bardies (1999) contained five normally developing French infants, aged
10 to 17 months. These data were also drawn from videotaped play sessions. The final
data were from Barrett et al. (1991). Subjects were four monolingual British children
who were followed from 6 months to two years of age. Data in this study were collected
from videotaping play sessions and from mothers’ inventories.
4.2 Analysis
The data were initially classified according to sex, nationality, language, and the
number and types o f words that the child knew at the time o f data collection. These
variables were included in preliminary data analysis because these factors have been
linked to language development by some authors (Bates et al. 1995; Fenson et al. 1994).
Because language development has been shown to correlate much better with vocabulary
size than with age, age was not included in this study (Bates and Goodman 1999). For
each word type, statistical models were developed to predict membership in that word
category and to determine which, if any, variables were significant to explain the data.
Additionally, the resulting models were tested to determine how well they explained the
observations. For each model, the population o f interest was children knowing between
three and 44 words who were one of the three included nationalities - American, British,
or French.
" See also Section 1.3.7.
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4.2.1

Word Categories
The process of analyzing collections of first words is complicated by the fact that

every researcher has a slightly different way of “coding” first words. In fact, there is no
evidence that children themselves group words into categories (Barrett 1995),
Nevertheless, some form o f categorization was necessary to analyze the data.
Researchers categorize early vocabularies differently depending on the focus of their
research. For instance, James (1990) and Barrett (1995) report that researchers who
emphasize the importance o f pragmatic fimction categorize by communicative intent.^'
Barrett (1995) focuses on patterns o f developmental change and categorizes words as
context-bound, decontextualized, and over- or under-extended. Most researchers
studying lexical development use standard word classes corresponding to parts of speech
in traditional grammar (Smiley and Huttenlocher 1993; Fenson et al. 1994; De BoyssonBardies and Vihman unpublished study).
My purpose was to compare the use of object labels with other kinds of words,
particularly words used for social communication, such as inteijections and greetings, so
I categorized words as: nouns used as object labels, proper nouns, events (verbs),
adjectives, pronouns, imitative sounds, and words with social or emotional content. I
believe it is important to separate proper nouns fi*om other nouns because they are
cognitively different, at least for adults: proper nouns are singular referring expressions
and do not represent a category of things. If there are innate categories and innate linking

Dore’s Wsi o f primitive speech acts mc\udQS labeling, repeating, answering, requesting, calling, greeting,
protesting, and practicing. Hailiday’s list includes instrumental, regulatory, interactional, personal,
heuristic., and imaginative (James 1990).
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rules, these words could not be included in the same class as object names. I believe
there are more dimensions or layers of meaning to proper nouns because they can be part
of means-ends routines and may involve social feedback and reinforcement. They carry
emotional content not associated with object labels and they may index situations,
emotions, rewards, social and emotional gratification, and satisfaction of physical needs.
Object labels represent only the object, its qualities, and the context in which it occurs.
Like proper nouns, words categorized as having emotional or social content index
situations, social and emotional gratification, and even satisfaction of physical needs.
Words in this category include the inteijections and greetings that ofl;en entail social
routines. These words included hi, hello, hiya, bye bye, nite-nite, thank you, scuse me,
pat-a-cake, and boo. Other words considered to have emotional content included no,
wow, ouch, owie, ow, whee, yes, yeah.
Object labels include animate and inanimate objects such as kitty, doggy, duck^
and cracker, water, shoe. Included in events were verbs such as go, ride, walk and also
any word associated with action or request for action, a change, or a motion. For
example, go potty, go bye-bye, and down were included in this group because they are
either actions or requests for action. Although some of these ‘Svords” are written as two
words, they are included because they fimction as single words rather than as
combinations. The word more was included in the verb category because early use of
this word has been documented as a request for action (Barrett et al. 1991 ).
The published data that I used were not previously categorized. Vihman’s (1996)
study focused on phonological development so word categorization was not important.
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De Boysson-Bardies (1999) also studied phonological development and, although her
work commented on the relationship between early word types and personality
development, she also did not specify word categories. Barrett et al. (1991) focused on
the relationship between occurrences o f a child’s use of words and the mother’s use, not
on word categories.
I allowed, as a word, any sound uttered that seems to have meaning and is used
fo r the purpose o f communication (the definition of a word that was discussed in Section
1.1.7). In addition, several mothers who I interviewed said that what they recognized as
words were sounds their children had used on several occasions. My definition allows
imitative sounds such as vroom and choo-choo and animal sounds such as meow, bow
wow, and baa.
4.3 Results
Table 4.1 shows raw percentages of words in each word class for very early
vocabularies (10 words or less) and the overall percentages for all data sets. As is evident
in the above discussion of word categories, there are cognitive similarities between words

Proportion in word lists of 10
words or fewer than 10 words
Proportion in word lists of more
than 10 words

N

P

E

V

I

D

A

22.8%

23.9%

23.9%

9.2%

8.7%

5.4%

6.0%

35.8%

22.4%

17.5%

10.8% 4.4%

2.3%

6.7%

P+E
47.8

%
39-9

%

Table 4.1: Overall percentages of word types in the collected data.
In this table, N = nouns, P = proper nouns, E = words with social/emotional content, V = verbs,
I = imitative sounds, D = deictic pronouns, A = adjectives, P+E = all proper nouns plus all
social/emotional words.
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that have emotional or social value and the class of proper nouns. Hence, these two
groups were combined for additional analysis in addition to being handled separately.
See Appendix II for a complete listing of the sample data.
Table 4.1 reveals that the absolute overall proportion of proper nouns and
social/emotional words decreases as the children’s vocabularies increase while the
proportion o f nouns increases. For example, word lists of 10 or fewer words contain
47.8% proper nouns plus social/emotional words while later lists contain only 39.9%. On
the other hand, the earlier lists contain 2 2 .8 % nouns while word lists with over 10 words
contain 35.8% nouns. The effect seen here is actually stronger than the table indicates.
This is because the word lists for children knowing more than ten words include their
first ten words. Thus, the percentages for the larger word lists are affected by the earlier
data. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that a child uses an even higher percentage of
nouns later than earlier and an even smaller percentage of words with emotional or social
content later than earlier. There were not enough data samples to be able to make valid
conclusions for verbs, imitative sounds, deictic pronouns, and adjectives. That is, the
data sample was too small and the variance too large to be able to analyze or make
predictions about these word classes. They were omitted from further analysis.
The analysis asks two questions. First, is there a predictable proportion of each
word class in a child’s early vocabulary for children of the same nationality and gender?
For example, is it possible to predict what percentage of nouns will appear in the
vocabularies of American boys who have learned 10 words? Or do similar children vary
too much to predict the percentage of nouns that they leam in their early vocabularies?
Second, is there any trend in the composition of the vocabularies as the number of words
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increases? For example, does the proportion o f nouns increase with an increase in the
size o f the vocabulary? These questions reflect the two hypotheses o f the thesis. If the
proportions of word classes are not predictable, then the first part of the thesis, the claim
that early word production does not represent an innate search for nouns, is supported. If
first words are not predictable, then it is clearly not possible to claim that they are
innately linked to whole objects. If there were a trend in the composition of early
vocabularies indicating that an early relatively high proportion o f social/emotional words
to nouns is reversing and, in fact, nouns are in the process of becoming more important,
then this would support the second part of the thesis. Namely, the claim is that early
word production is the result o f social interaction routines but that later words begin to
represent a developing understanding that words link to categories.
Before turning to the formal statistical analysis o f these questions, it will be useful
view the data graphically. As to the first question. Figure 4.1 graphically demonstrates
the large amount of variability in early vocabularies. This figure plots the percentage
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Word Category
Figure 4.1 : Proportions of total vocabulary for children knowing 8-13 words. N =
nouns, P = proper nouns, E = words with emotional or social content, E + P = combined
proper nouns and social/emotional words.
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of nouns, proper nouns, words with social or emotional content, and combined proper
nouns and social/emotional words for vocabularies containing eight to thirteen words.
For example, in this vocabulary range, nouns may form anywhere from zero to over sixty
percent of the total number words that a child knows. The same huge variability is seen to
apply to the other word categories as well. At this stage of word production, the graph
shows that there is a very large variation in the content o f these vocabularies.
As to the second question. Figure 4.2 plots the number o f words in each child’s
vocabulary against the proportion o f words in the noun class. It reveals a slight upward
100 %
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Word List Size

Figure 4.2: Vocabulary size (word list size) plotted against the proportion of nouns in the list,

trend in proportion o f nouns as word list size increases. Figure 4.3 shows number of
words known plotted against the proportion of personal nouns plus social/emotional
words. It shows a slight downward trend in proportion o f proper nouns and
social/emotional words as word list size increases. These two figures suggest that the
proportion of nouns is increasing while the proportion of social/emotion words is
decreasing as vocabulary size increases. The two graphs provide a visual understanding
of what is happening to very early vocabularies. If the relative proportions of each word
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Figure 4.3: Vocabulary size (word list size) plotted against the proportion of Proper Nouns plus
Social/emotional words (all words considered to have social or emotional import) in the list

category were constant throughout childhood, then we would expect to see no evidence
of upward or downward trends in these graphs.
In order to determine whether there is formal statistical significance to the general
observations made about the data, linear regression models were developed for the word
classes o f nouns, proper nouns, social/emotional words, and the sum of proper nouns and
social/emotional wordsP For each of the samples (vocabularies) the percentage of
words in the category under consideration was the response variable for the model. In
preliminary tests, nationality, gender, and the number of words in the vocabulary of each
child were used as the explanatory variables for the model. It was discovered, however,
that the only variable that had a statistically significant effect on the regression model
was the number of words in the child’s vocabulary so further results will be discussed in

Ordinary least squares linear regression is a common statistical tool used to determine a linear model
which seeks to minimize the errors between the observed data and the predicted values. The method finds
an equation that best fits the data values. That is, it plots a line through the graph of data points that
minimizes the difference between the calculated values and the actual observations.
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terms o f only vocabulary size unless specified. Least squares linear regression requires
two assumptions. First, it requires that each of the samples is independent. That is, the
number o f proper nouns, for example, that one child knows has no effect on the number
of proper nouns that another child might know. With few exceptions, the children who
were included in the study didn’t even know one another so we can reasonably assume
that this assumption is valid. The second assumption is that there is constant variance in
the response variable among the samples. However, this was clearly not the case because
the response variable is measured as a percentage of the total number o f words in a given
child's vocabulary. The variance in this response is naturally higher when the size of the
word list is small and lower when the size o f the word list is higher. This effect is
commonplace in percentage data and it was observed in this particular data set. To see
this, one may observe that the fan shapes of the data in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 shows earlier
vocabularies exhibit greater variation than later ones.
Since the constant variance requirement could not be met, a correction had to be
made in the model. Weighted least squares regression is performed the same way as
regular regression but uses a weighting factor that is based on the source of the variation.
The change in variance was caused by the number o f words in a given word list, so the
weighting used was

where n is the word list size. Table 4.2 shows the results o f

weighted least squares regression using word list size as the explanatory factor.
To apply statistical analysis in answering the first question, as to whether there is
a predictable proportion of any word class in early vocabularies, we refer to the Rsquared values in Table 4.2. The R-squared value measures the strength of the
correlation between the real values and the predicted values o f the model. It gives the
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percentage o f variance in the response variable that is explained by the model. If the
model fits perfectly, the R-squared value would be 100% or 1.0. In a good model, Rsquared is high and should, ideally, be above .80. The highest value in Table 4.2 is for

Coefficient Value
of word list size
Proper nouns
Nouns
Social/emotional words
Sum o f proper nouns
And emotionaFsocial

-.0012

.0067
-.0033
-.0046

t-statistic

R^

.5879
.0056
.0491
.0893

.0067
.1618
.0851
.0642

Intercept
.2571
.1845
.2603
.5173

Table 4.2: Results of regression for word class categories.
For each category listed, a regression model was developed to test the hypothesis that the proportion of
the given category in a child’s vocabulary could be predicted based on the number of words a child
knows. If a coefficient value is positive, the proportion is increasing as the number of words increases.
If a coefficient value is negative, the proportion decreases as the number of words increases. The
numbCT of words a child knows is considered statistically significant in explaining these proportions if
the t-statistics are less than . 10 (meaning that the errors made by the model are acceptably small). The
strength of a model is considered good if the values are greater than .80. The intercept is the
model's prediction of a baseline proportion. For example, the model for social/emotional word
proportion (S/E) would be S/E = .2603 - .0033 *W, where W is the size of the word list.

nouns at .1618. This means that any predictions about the proportions of words in each
of the given categories would be extremely weak. There were no word classes that could
be predicted with the model. This does not mean that there is not enough data. The Rsquared value could not be improved by getting more data. That is, it is not
mathematically possible for the R-squared value to approach 1.0 even in a larger sample
if it is this low in the smaller sample. Even in models that used the additional variables
o f child’s sex and nationality, the highest R-squared value obtained was .2111. None of
the models were able to predict the proportion o f words in these word classes
successfully to even a very liberal standard. This negative result provides statistical
validity to the intuition of Figure 4.1. Because o f the variability in a child’s early
vocabulary, it is not possible to predict the proportion o f word types in that vocabulary.
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To apply statistical analysis to the second question, as to whether there is any
statistically significant trend in the composition of the vocabularies as the size of the
vocabulary increases, we turn to the t-statistic in Table 4.2. The t-statistic is a measure of
how much the observed data differs jfrom the predicted results. In this analysis, it tests
the hypothesis that the number of words has no effect on the proportion of a given word
class. A low value o f the t-statistic (less than . 1) suggests that this hypothesis is false. In
all cases except proper nouns, we can conclude that the word list size was a statistically
significant (t < . 1) factor in explaining the proportion o f the word class under
consideration.
The statistical significance of the t-statistic for nouns and for social/emotional
words and the combined proper nouns and social/emotional words, means that one can
make conclusions based on the coefficient value. A positive value in the model indicates
that a category is less important in early vocabularies than it is later on. A negative
coefficient value means that the word category is more important earlier than later. For
example, as the size o f the word list increases by one word, the proportion of words in
that list falling in the noun category increases by 0.67% since the coefficient value of
word list size for nouns is .0067. On the other hand, there was a negative value in the
social and emotional model, indicating that words with social or emotional content are
more important in early vocabularies but less important later. Specifically, if the size of
the word list increases by one word, the overall proportion of words in the social or
emotional category decreases by 0.46%.
This is the result that could be seen pictorially in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Having
statistically significant positive or negative coefficient values in these models is
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important to the thesis. Word category proportions, although not predictable, are not
static. If these categories were always the same from the very beginning o f word
production, the coefficients would have been zero.
4.4 Discussion
The statistical analysis of the data demonstrates that word categories cannot be
predicted in early vocabularies but the number o f nouns is increasing and the number of
words with social and emotional content is decreasing. The word list size is significant in
the sense that it demonstrates that the nature of a child’s vocabulary is changing but that
does not mean that the model itself can predict what kinds o f words will be in an
individual child’s first vocabulary.
The main result of this analysis is that it is not possible to predict the proportion
o f any word class in early vocabularies. Using all available information, mathematical
models of early language were extremely weak. There is too much variation among
children to be able to predict what kinds o f words children will leam first. The inability
to make predictions about what word classes will be included in children’s first words
supports the thesis that children are not looking for object labels when they first begin to
produce words.
The other result o f the analysis is that words that are emotionally or socially
significant are important in very early vocabularies but are less important in larger
vocabularies. While nouns are always important, they are not especially important at
first. If proper nouns are combined with social/emotional words, we saw in Table 4 .1
that they make up 47.8% o f very early vocabularies, whereas nouns represent only 22.8%
of these vocabularies. Later, social/emotional words decrease to 35.8% and nouns
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increase to 39.9%. These trends are statistically significant and demonstrate that words
with social/emotional content are very important at the beginning of word production but
become less important as the number of words in the child’s vocabulary increases. The
use of words that have social or emotional content implies that social interaction may be
of primary importance to infants. This supports the second claim o f the thesis, namely
that children’s early word productions reflect an interest in social communication rather
than knowledge of language.
Many researchers have noted that although there are language-specific variations,
nouns are the dominant category regardless of language being learned (de BoyssonBardies 1999; de Boysson-Bardies and Vihman unpublished; Markman 1993; Waxman
and Kozowski 1990; Waxman 1994; 1997a,b; Benedict 1979). By the time a child’s
vocabulary approaches 50 words, de Boysson-Bardies calculates that over 50% of
American children’s words are objects or animals. Even Japanese children’s
vocabularies, whose languages regularly use verbs and adjectives for reference, include
45% nouns. However, although these later vocabularies may show statistically
significant proportions of word classes, the results o f these studies cannot be applied to
very early vocabularies. The current study shows that nouns are not £is important in early
word production as the larger word lists indicate. Early on, the percentages are highly
variable - so variable that it is not possible to predict the initial word class proportions.
Later vocabularies are not as variable and begin to converge as differences between
individuals even out (de Boysson-Bardies 1999; Fenson et al. 1994; Bates and Goodman
1999). Later on, the percentages will be predictable because the variability is decreasing
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(Bates and Goodman 1999). However, very early vocabularies are highly variable, are
changing during early acquisition, and can be said to be in a transitional stage.
The transitional nature of these results suggests that something important is
happening to the child’s vocabulary. I have suggested that early words are not linguistic
in the sense o f representing semantic categories. It is possible that the transition children
are making is a change from the use of words as a form of social communication to the
use of words as categories. The transitional nature of this stage may be a reflection of
cognitive development. By the time they know many words, children do link words to
categorical meaning. But in the very beginning, words are merely sounds that have social
value.
While not statistically analyzed, there are some interesting trends in the contents
of the early vocabularies. Examination of my data samples (see Appendix 11) reveals
that, while no occasionally appears in early vocabularies, common use of success/failure
words such as uh-oh, there, no, did it and disappearance words such as gone and all-gone
rarely appears before the 10-word stage. Gopnik and Meltzoff (1986) correlate meansends task and object permanence task abilities with the acquisition of disappearance
words and success/failure words. If they are correct, then the current study supports the
theory that children do not have these cognitive abilities before they begin to speak but
that these abilities are developing as they leam to produce words.
4.5 Conclusion
Statistical analysis of early vocabularies supports the conclusion that children are
not innately predisposed to look for object labels when they begin producing words.
Vocabularies of 50 or more words might have smaller variances and, hence, have
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predictable word classes but this result cannot be applied to very early word productions.
Further, social/emotional words are very important in early vocabularies and become less
important later. Conversely, nouns are not especially important in early vocabularies but
become more important in later vocabularies.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusions

5.1 Summary of Research
In this thesis, I have presented arguments supporting the hypothesis that children
are not predisposed to search for object labels when they begin to speak. A small study
of 46 children’s early vocabularies was conducted to support this hypothesis. The study
showed that the proportion of word classes in very early vocabularies (three to less than
fifty words) are not statistically predictable. Hence, the claim that nouns make up a large
share of early vocabularies was not supported at this stage of word production.
Additionally, the makeup o f these early vocabularies changes rapidly. The study
demonstrated to a high level of significance that the proportion of nouns in their
vocabularies increases and the number o f words with emotional or social content
decreases. This result supports the second part of my hypothesis that children’s early
words begin as sounds associated with socially and emotionally salient contexts.
5.2 What Can We Leam From Early Vocabularies?
Many studies have shovm that two and three-year-old children extend categories
(Waxman 1994; Waxman and Kosowski 1990) and attach a novel label to a whole object
(Markman 1993). Several authors have suggested that by the time children know fifty
words, the largest category of words in their vocabularies wül be nouns and there will be
language-specific patterns (de Boysson Bardies 1999; Vihman 1996; de Boysson Bardies
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and Vihman 1991; Gopnik 1981; Gopnik 2ind Choi 1995)/^ The results of my
investigation show that these findings cannot be extrapolated to the very first words that
infants leam. Earlier investigators worked with children who were already able to
communicate and respond linguistically and who usually had already passed the word
spurt. The transitional nature o f the very early vocabularies that I worked with indicate
that, whatever may typify later vocabularies, especially as they approach or pass the
typical rapid word acquisition associated with a word spurt, features o f these vocabularies
cannot be applied to first words. Very early vocabularies may be qualitatively different
than later vocabularies because the type of learning is qualitatively different. Infants are
primarily concerned with interpersonal functions and the regulation o f social behavior
(Grieve and Hoogenrad 1986). They can enhance their ability to initiate and maintain
social interaction by producing sounds that their parents interpret as word production.
Infants quickly realize that words are usefiil for more than social interaction. Perhaps by
the time they can say between 10 and 20 words, children begin to use words as language,
with an understanding that words refer to categories of things and actions. This may be
associated with a change fi*om a child-centered world to one where people and things
interact with each other (Lock 1997).
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1986) relate means-ends task and object permanence task
abilities with the acquisition of disappearance words such as gone and all-gone and
success/failure words such as uh-oh, there, no, did it. Children may not be able to use
certain words until they have acquired these cognitive abilities. The data presented in

For instance, 91% of the words produced by children learning American English are nouns
while their Japanese counterparts average only 56% (de Boysson Bardies 1999).
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this paper are suggestive that such a feature of early speech exists and that further
research might confirm or disconfirm this effect. I suggest that children do not have
these cognitive abilities before they begin to leam words but that these abilities are
developing while they are in their early word-leaming stages. The fact that these words
rarely occur in vocabularies of fewer than ten words and never in vocabularies under five
words may be evidence that some cognitive abilities necessary for language acquisition
are not necessary for children to leam their very first words.
On the other hand, actually learning and saying words may help a child develop
cognitive abilities. Premack’s (1984) work with chimpanzees suggests that certain
concepts are impossible without language. While I contend that first words are not truly
language, they provide the raw material for a child to begin to leam language. Research
with children as well as computer models provide evidence to support the hypothesis that
children may need to leam words before they are able to develop linguistic concepts and
categories (Bates and Goodman 1999; Allen and Seidenberg 1999; Goldberg 1999;
Redington and Chater 1997; Plunkett 1995; Bates et al. 1995; Vygotsky in Rieber and
Carton 1987). Computer models show that the language children hear spoken around
them contains enough information to extract semantic structure (Redington and Chater
1997; Plunkett 1995). Children’s brains may contain pathways similar to neural
networks to process this information and they may need to leam words in order to acquire
certain concepts.
It is very likely that early words are leamed one at a time without any connections
between them. Even words that seem referential fi-om the beginning are leamed because
they are fi*equently used by caregivers in particular contexts and are emotionally salient
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(Barrett et al. 1991). Words gradually become decontextualized and become meaningful
categories. Categorization entails symbolic connections among words, their meanings,
and their uses. While they can’t use syntactic bootstrapping to leam to produce their first
words, once children leam the meanings of some words and determine their semantic
categorizations, they can use syntactic stmcture to infer the meanings of new words
(Snow 1999; Bloom 1993). Some word meanings, in fact, cannot be leamed without
syntactic information to acquire them (Gleitman 1993). Whether fi-om innate or
emergent knowledge, children quickly become sensitive to word categories, to phrases
and clauses, and the ways o f arranging those units to express events and relationships and
leam where word types can occur (Hirsh-Pasek and GofinkofT 1996). However, children
initially seem oblivious to the syntax o f a word (Bloom 2000).
5.3 Implications for Future Research
This thesis suggests a number of directions for future research. The study
conducted included only a small number o f children’s vocabularies fi-om a variety of
sources. Some results reached statistical significance but more data samples, collected in
a more uniform manner, would allow better inferences to be drawn. An ideal data sample
would consist of data collected fi-om several hundred children in a situation where a
trained observer confirmed mothers’ inventories. This data sample was too small, for
instance, to be able to say anything statistically significant about children’s early use of
adjectives, verbs, deictics (pronouns), or imitative sounds. Additionally, this data
represented snapshots in time - no attempt was made to follow children as they leamed
more words. A diachronic study of individual children might confirm or disconfirm the
trends that were observed. The immediate direction this study suggests for future
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research, then, would be to include a larger number o f children who could be followed
from the time they said their first words to when they begin to put two words together.
Researchers are not currently in agreement on how words become symbolic.
When and how does this happen? What can the statistical analysis o f the transitional
nature o f children’s vocabularies teU us about children’s cognitive development? Does
maturation provide the cognitive abilities necessary for children to advance in their word
production or does word production provide the catalyst necessary for learning to
progress? Perhaps both processes occur. Some researchers emphasize the importance of
the age of the child but others think grammar development is related to the number of
words a child knows (Bates and Goodman 1999). It is possible that, when a certain
number o f words have been leamed, the one-word stage becomes mathematically
unstable, can no longer be used successfrilly to represent events, and some restructuring
occurs as '"words” naturally break down into grammatical categories (Nowak et al. 2001;
Nowak et al. 2000). The number and usage of words in the one-word stage might be
used to predict when the two-word stage is about to occur. Could this be determined by
studying the contents and statistical trends in children’s vocabularies?
This study may also have some implications for parents and educators of young
children. It confirms earlier findings that social interaction with caregivers is very
important in early language acquisition. There is a correlation between quality of
attachment and cognitive skills, and also between cognition and language (Grieve and
Hoogenrad 1986). If the quality of attachment is poor, social skills will be
underdetermined and language, although not absent, may be hindered. Ramey et al.
(1981) found that when mothers respond to infant vocalization with touch rather than
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with vocalizations, infants are slower in the development of cognitive and language
skills. This interaction difference results in small cognitive differences in the first year of
life but large differences in the second year. Successful learning depends on having a
sympathetic teacher. Fowler (1981) showed that an intervention program emphasizing
attachment and increased use o f language by the mother is effective in enhancing
cognitive and language skills if applied at any time in the first year for a period of several
weeks. Further research on the relationship between social interaction and early word
production is needed to clarify the significance of early mother-child relationships in the
development of language. Long-term studies would be needed to determine if there are
lasting effects of these early factors that affect language acquisition.
5.4 Conclusion
Learning to say words is clearly a complex process that involves innate social
predispositions but also depends heavily on the environment to proceed successfully.
Some cognitive abilities are prerequisites and must be in place before word production
can occur while others, including knowledge of word categories, cannot develop untü
words begin to be leamed. One of the lessons fi*om this thesis is that what happens in the
mind of an older child cannot be used to predict how an infant’s mind works. Early oneword utterances reflect knowledge that the child has about the world —knowledge about
the social world o f people and the cognition that other people are ready and vvdlling to
respond to them (Mervis 1987). But these very early utterances do not reflect knowledge
of categories. Early vocabularies can, in fact, be characterized as being in a state of
transition and this transition reflects a change in the nature of the words they contain.
Earliest word productions are connected to emotional and social contexts while later
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vocabularies reflect true word classes and categories. Evidence from the study reported
in this paper supports the conclusion that categories develop gradually as the child leams
words.
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Appendix I
Neural Networks
Central to emergentist theories is the family of computer models known as
Artificial Neural Networks. Defined briefly in Chapter 1, the models will be more fully
described in this section, including how they work, how they are applied to language
learning, and why some researchers think they describe the learning process.
What is an Artificial Neural Network?
The concept o f an artificial neural network is related to the concept of artificial
intelligence. The idea that we might be able to create an artificial intelligence has a long
h isto ry .H o w ev e r, not until the twentieth century had enough work been done on the
actual function o f the brain to be able to describe how neurons behave. In 1943, Warren
McCuUoch and Walter Pitts published a description of a neural network with a logical
calculus o f the sequences o f nerve connections based on the fact that nerves fire in an allor-none manner (Jones 1999).
Associationist theories have also been around for a long time. In the seventeenth
century, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke suggested that knowledge, gained through
experience with the world, is stored in the mind in the form of associations. Like
Aristotle, these people were empiricists - they believed that events in the environment
give rise to thoughts and ideas. These thoughts and ideas could excite other thoughts and

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a popular diversion was the creation and use of small
automata - machines that were specially constructed to emulate particular activities of animals or humans.
In 1748, de la Mettrie’s L ’Homme Machine (Man a Machine) was published. He claimed that all human
activity had a mechanical explanation. This was not well received at the time and the document was
burned as heresy (Jones 1999).
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ideas and were interconnected in the mind. Connectionist theory views these associations
as connections between neuronal units or nodes of information (Payne and Wenger
1998). While in some ways similar to associationism, connectionism emphasizes that
learning involves input from both the environment and from internal or top-down (higherlevel) conceptual processes that rely on knowledge and memory. The neural network
theories developed in the 1940’s appeared to be the best kinds o f models for these
theories. As early as 1949, D.O. Hebb suggested a method for designing artificial
neurons so that learning could occur. His model included a Hebbian Learning Principle,
that is, the strength of the connection between neurons is adjusted to reflect its familiarity
with an input. The more probable the input to a neuron is, the larger the output will
become. Similar models were described in the 1950’s and 1960’s but could not be
implemented because the immense number o f connections between nodes required far
more computational power than was available at the time. Figures A la and A lb illustrate
how quickly the number o f connections increases as more nodes and layers are added to
the network. Note that although there is just one additional layer of four nodes, the

Input

Input

Output

Figure Ala: A simple network

Inner Layer

Output

Figure Alb: A more complex network
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number of connections increases from three to sixteen.

For a fimctional model that

could solve real problems, the computational requirements o f such interactive models
were well beyond the ability either of an individual to calculate by hand or o f the
primitive computers available to scientists in the 1940’s.
Implementation of these models was made possible by the invention of
inexpensive high-speed computers. Such models have now been used not only for
language modeling but are currently being used in a number of applications to solve other
real-life problems.^^ Neural networks are used to solve problems that use, as input, large
numbers of what may appear to be independent variables. They are able to detect
similarities in inputs even though a particular input may never have been seen previously.
A network can detect important predictive patterns, not apparent to observers, that allow
for excellent interpolation capabilities, especially when the input data is noisy^^ as would
certainly be the case for infents and small children who are trying to make sense out of
their environment.
Many of the accomplishments o f neural networks seem mysterious and almost
unbelievable. Neural network programs work by making many very small adjustments to

In these and later diagrams, circles represent nodes or discrete pieces of information. In a computer
model, of course, information must be numeric in order to be processed. The lines connecting these nodes
represent operations performed on the contents of nodes. The meeting points of these lines or cormections
represent the results of calculations done on incoming information. Output nodes represent an answer to
the problem presented to the network. Inner layer nodes are both the result of calculations and the input to
further calculations.
Applications for this kind of computer program include air traffic control, appraisal and valuation of
property, betting on horse races, direct mail advertising, economic models, employee hiring, expert
systems, fraud detection, medical research, photo and fingerprint identification, prediction of lake and river
levels, scheduling of buses, trains, and airplanes, and weather prediction (Cormac 1999).
In physics, noise is defined as any disturbance that obscures or reduces the clarity or quality of a signal
(Morris 1970). For psychologists, this kind of noise may be external such as the static heard when a radio
is not tuned to a station or it may be internal interference generated by spontaneous activity in the nervous
system (Payne and Wenger 1998).
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the formulas that calculate answers, storing those answers as intermediate results, and
making many calculations with those intermediate results before passing them on to final
processing and outputting an answer. The whole process obviously requires a large
number of calculations and a lot of memory storage. The goal is to get the right answer
no matter how many repeated approximations it takes. Solutions are possible for these
programs, as they are for our brains, because both brains and modem computers are able
to make many computations very quickly and have large amounts o f storage available
(Elman et al. 1996). In the process of finding the right answer, patterns develop in the
network that make it possible to predict a correct result when novel data are presented.
A very simple example will demonstrate how these networks operate. Suppose a
ballpark hotdog vendor wants to know how many hotdogs and buns to order. He collects
data about baseball games and their environment for a period of time and notes how
many hotdogs he actually sold on those days. Table A1 presents some possible sample
data.

Day
Day
Day
Day

1
2
3
4

Tickets sold Day of the week Temperature Hotdogs Sold
32
13
Monday
9
54
T uesday
16
25
Wednesday
10
2
8
60
54
Saturday
35
Table Al: Data from the ballpark

Since computer programs need numerical input for calculations, non-numerical
input data must be converted to numbers. For our purposes a number fi-om one to seven
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can be used to represent the day o f the week/^ Now the vendor creates a model like the
one in Figure A2.
Lines or connections between circles or nodes (labeled T for “Tickets sold,” D for
“Day o f the week,” and P for “Daily temperature”) in this schematic represent
mathematical formulas that multiply the values from the input nodes by a multiplier or
weight (labeled M, through M 3 ) that represents the strength of the connection. The
resulting values are added together (T x Mi + D x M 2 + P x M 3 ) to give an answer
represented by the output node (labeled N). Multipliers may be set randomly to begin
with. It doesn’t matter what the multipliers or weights are initially set to because

Input nodes

— Output node

(^ t\
^
(o )-^ t4 r

Ip y

T: Number o f tickets sold
D: Day of the week
P; Daily temperature
N: Number of hotdogs
sold (answer)
Mn : Multiplier
(initially arbitrary)
N = T x M i + D x M 2 + P XM 3

Figure A2: The ballpark vendor’s model

the program is designed to adjust them when approximate answers are compared to the
desired answer. The programmer does not need to anticipate what the weights are to
ensure a solution. It is in these weights that knowledge is gradually built up. This
program imitates architectural innateness - the weights are not preset. That is, there is

Monday = 1, Tuesday = 2, Wednesday = 3,. . . Sunday = 7.

130

no information or defaults wired into the system. Rather, the system defines what kinds
of problems can be solved. Representational innateness would require these weights
initially be set so that the “right” answer is inevitable. Emergentism claims that there is
no need to burden the human genome with billions of preset weights. They can be
assumed to be initially random because the structure of the system guarantees a solution,
not the initial contents of the system
The first step in running the example model is to train the system on data that has
been previously collected. In any model, the “right” answer depends on what is being
modeled. For instance, in a model o f phonology acquisition, this step might be analogous
to a child hearing adults say words many times. The phonological representations that
the child hears are what the system considers the “right” answer. In our ballpark model,
the number o f hotdogs sold on one day is the “right” answer. For instance, if we
arbitrarily start with each of the connection weights set t o .5, using data fi-om Table A l, a
first approximation o f day 1 (Monday) output is:
13 (tickets) x .5 + 1 (Monday) x .5 + 32 (temperature) x .5 = 23
This is too high since our vendor only sold 9 hotdogs that day. This program is
written so that each approximate answer is compared to the known answer and the
weights (multipliers) are adjusted based on the difference. Since this number is high, the
weights should be decreased. In a model o f word learning, this might be analogous to
processes in the brain that allow production to gradually improve to match expected
output. We do not know how the weights are reset in the brain or what kinds of
neurological processes accomplish the changes. Designing algorithms for computer
programs to alter weights based on output error is still something of an art and depends
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largely on the programmer’s skill. In our example, changing the weights according to the
ratio between the correct answer and the answer we arrived at will sufSce as a simple
demonstration. In this case, since the first approximation was 23 while the known answer
was 9, the program might adjust the multiplier to 9/23 o f .5 or .2. A second
approximation o f the answer is:
(13

X

.2) + (1

X

.2) + (32

X

.2) = 9.2

This is a respectably close second estimate o f the expected answer of 9 hotdogs.
Of course, every day’s data must be run through the system until each data set gives a
reasonably close approximation to the observed correct answer. Once the model works to
approximate correct answers for our data collection, it could be used to estimate how
many hotdogs the vendor could expect to sell in the future. In a phonological model, this
might be the equivalent of a child’s gradually improving word production. Eventually, a
child can reliably produce words.
This extremely simple model is not intended to explain the kind of model that
would link words and their meanings but merely to demonstrate that neural network
models are based on simple ideas. Early in the development o f network models, it
became apparent that such systems would work much better and could solve much more
complex problems if there were more nodes between the input and output. Figures A lb
and A3b illustrate graphically what this kind of network might look like. All nodes
between any two layers are interconnected but the answers computed for the middle layer
are not normally available as visible output. Hence, they are called hidden and the set of
inner nodes is called the hidden layer. This hidden layer makes it possible to accumulate
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(a)

oi
Figure A3: Various types of connectionist networks, (a) A fully recurrent network; (b) a three-layer
network with hidden nodes; (c) a complex network consisting of several modules. Arrows indicate flow of
information (Elman et al. 1996).

information from earlier data so that the model can be used to predict more complicated
kinds of processes.
As with any computer program, the fimctioning o f these models depends entirely
on how the programmer designs them. They vary depending on how the weights are
initially set up, what formulas govern error corrections, how fast the weights change, how
real-life data are approximated numerically, how many hidden nodes there are relative to
the number of inputs and outputs, what directions information can flow, and how
neuronal output is represented. Figure A3 illustrates some o f the different ways
processing can occur.
Designing networks to solve problems is still as much an art as a skill and reflects
the theoretical claims of the modeler (Mangrich 2000; Elman et al. 1996). Networks use
simple processes to leam, yet yield surprisingly complex results. From what we now
know about brains, these networks represent a very simplified, but biologically plausible
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model of neuronal connections. They have been used to demonstrate that many kinds of
learning can occur without preprogramming rules into the system to find desired answers.
How Are Artificial Neural Networks Used in Linguistic Research?
Since they were first described, there have been many different kinds of artificial
neural networks designed. The kind o f model that Rumelhart and McClelland used in the
1980’s to model English past tense was a very simple one called a pattern associator. It
was Uke our hotdog vendor’s model in that it consisted o f just a set o f input units and a
set o f output units with no hidden layers.

Phonemes o f a word were characterized as a

series of patterns of zeroes and ones depending on what features were represented by
those phonemes. Output patterns were considered successful if the activated features in
the output matched those o f the correct past tense (Rumelhart and McClelland 1993).
The patterns of learning and overall success rates o f production led Rumelhart and
McClelland to conclude their model demonstrated that a neural network could leam
English past tenses without resorting to mles. However, it represented a very simplistic
view of language knowledge and has been heavily criticized for leaving out important
features of language. For instance, the model could not discriminate between words that
are semantically different but phono logically identical such as break and brake.
Recent advances in the design o f ANN’s have made modeling features of
language acquisition much more successful and flexible. One is the previously described

Rumelhart and McClelland’s model more closely mimicked actual neurons in the brain, which are either
on or off. That is, they either receive enough stimulation to fire or they don’t fire at all. Rumelhart and
McClelland (1996) designed their model to so that nodes required a threshold value in order to produce any
output at all. If the calculated value of input to the node exceeded this threshold value, the value at the
output node was set to 1. Lower values resulted in the node being set to 0.
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addition of a ‘hidden’ layer o f nodes between the input and output nodes (See Figure
A3b). Newer methods o f adjusting weights have been developed that more closely
approximate what we think happens in the brain/^ Another modification was the
development of the simple recurrent network. Since spoken language is processed
linearly in time, information spoken in the early part of a sentence must be remembered
for a period of time, sometimes until the end o f the sentence. To replicate this process, an
extra layer o f units, called context units, stores the contents o f the hidden units at one
point in time. In the next step, the system adds that stored information back into the
hidden units along with the new input. In this way, the network’s activity at any point in
time reflects whatever external input is being presented plus its own prior state. Hidden
units thus reflect not only new information but prior remembered information as well
(Elman et al. 1996).
Even more complex models have been developed that are able to disambiguate
embedded sentences. In the Subsymbohc Parser for Embedded Clauses (SPEC) model,
the tasks of segmenting input word sequences into clauses, forming case-role
representations, and keeping track of recursive embeddings are separated into different
modules (Miikkulainen and Mayberry 1999). The recursive nature o f each module
allows that module to remember earlier parts of the sentence. The combined system is
able to generalize to novel sentences with embedded clauses. For instance, the system

In conjunction with the use of hidden layers, a method of adjustment of the connection weights called
backpropagation allows programs to adjust the hidden nodes when their values are unknown. Differences
between the values of the observed output nodes and the expected values are calculated and the weights
leading to the output are adjusted based on those differences. Since there are more layers now than in the
simple two-layer model, we assume that each of the inputs to those hidden units are partly responsible for
the error and adjust them accordingly. Since the changes are propagated backward from the output back
into the network, the process is called backpropagation (Elman et al. 1996).
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can successfully parse a sentence such as “The girl saw the boy who chased the cat” into
appropriate case-roles and determine that a) “The girl saw the boy” and b) “The boy
chased the cat.” These kinds o f complex systems have made it possible to successfully
model many empirical observations about child language acquisition.
Elman et al. (1996) and Plunkett (1995) found that models programmed to accept
words in a sentence, one at a time, are particularly poor at predicting what word might
come next. The models, however, can activate a range of possible candidates based on
their probabilities of occurring in the next position in the sentence. Although the model
was deprived of any clues regarding the grammatical category or meaning of the words
that it used to make these predictions, the candidate words were found to be grouped by
such distinctions as animacy, human v, non-human, edible^ and breakable. That is,
candidate words belonged to the appropriate word class for the position in the sentence."^^
Hence, the distribution of words from a corpus consisting of thousands of sentences of
varying structure allowed the network to carry out its task. The only stimuli were those
that are directly observable in the world and so, did not presuppose either an intelligent
teacher or previous knowledge as to the type o f grammar that was used to generate the
training set. The model showed that distributional information that is present in the input

These models represent words as patterns arranged hierarchically in clusters. Similar patterns are
arranged close together; more distant patterns are grouped farther away. Analysis of the models revealed
that representations of individual lexical items in the sentences reflected both the lexical grouping of
individual words and their grammatical role in the sentence. Hence, it not only correctly predicted
potential candidates for the next word in a sentence, it resulted in the kind of categorization necessary to
determine word class and sentence structure. That is, verbs clustered together and nouns clustered
together. Because it classified words by their grammatical role, the models could determine whether a
word could play the role of subject, object, or verb in a sentence and what arguments a verb could take.
Hence, it correctly differentiated between verbs that required direct objects from those that only optionally
took objects and what categories those objects might be. (Elman 1999; Plunkett 1995).
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is sufiBcient to classify words hierarchically and that a relatively simple neural network
can leam to predict sentence structure without prior grammatical knowledge.
Redington and Chater (1997) studied a corpus o f 2.5 million words, much of
which was child-directed speech from the CHILDES databases. They used the two
words before and after the target word as context and studied statistical distributions of
what words could follow the target. Their study did not partition words into syntactic
categories, but produced a hierarchical tree similar to those produced by Elman et al.
(1996) and Plunkett (1995) whose structures reflect the syntactic relationship between
words. Such analyses do not prove that children use information in the speech stream to
categorize words but do show that such information is available. Artificial neural
networks have been able to demonstrate many features o f language acquisition including
the development o f a prototype, the lag o f production behind comprehension, the famous
“spurt” in speed o f vocabulary acquisition, the U-shaped learning curves observed in the
acquisition o f English past tense, and other under- and over-extension errors typical of
young children (Plunkett 1995; Rumelhart and McClelland 1993; Elman et al. 1996).
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Appendix II
Data collection sorted by number of words known.
Date Collected Child's Name
and age in mo.

# Siblings
Nationality

Words

Categories

/38

Larry
<12 mos

00
American

03
go, ride, walk

V, V, V

Bailey
08

01

American

03
dada, mama, puppy

P, P,N

Susan

01

10

American

03
hi, kitty, gram

E, N ,P

Kelly
10

00
American

03
dada, mama, doggy

P, P,N

Cody
14

01

American

03
mama, dada, tractor

P, P, N

2/15/01

Bridget
08

02
American

04
P, P, E, E
dada, mama, bye bye, pat-a-cake

2/19/01

Cooper
28

4 (twin)
American

04
E, E, P, P
no, thank you, dad, mama

/89

Molly

0

04
N, I, I, A
cracker, vroom, woof, yum

2/17/01
/50
2/15/01
2/17/01

American
m (V)

Laurent

05
French

10
E, N, V, D, E
alio (hello), lolo (bottle), donne (give), tiens (here),
non (no)

/92 (V)

Deborah

05
English

11
N ,E ,I, N , E
baby, hi, hu-hu-hu, monkey, uh-oh

/99 (BB)

Marie

05
French

13
D, E, N, P, P
ca (that), bravo, poupee (doll), Nono, mama

/99 (BB)

Noel

05
French

13
V,P,1,I, E
manger (eat), papa, poum (boom), wouah-wouah
(woof-woof), coucou (peek-a-boo)

2/15/01

Grace
16

03
American

05
P,P, A, E, P
mama, dad, good, hi, Armie

42

In this data presentation, V = (Vihman 1996), B = (Barrett 1986), BB = (de Boysson-Bardies 1999)
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Date Collected Child's Name
and age in mo.

# Siblings
Nationality

Words

Categories

/51

Steven
<12 mos

02
American

06
I, E, E, V, V, A
baa, bye bye, nite-nite, go potty, go bye-bye, pretty

/92(V)

Alice

0
English

06
N, P, E, E, P, E
baby, daddy, hello, hiya, mommy, no

12

0
French

06
E, A, 1, D, P, I
au revoir (goodbye), beau (beautiful), boom,
ca (there), mama, ouah-ouah (woof-woof)

Danielle
16

01

American

06
E, P, P, N, N, N
bye bye, mom, daddy, juice, shoe, toe

10

/92 (V)

2/15/01
799 (BB)

Charles

Leo
10

2/15/01
/75

/92

Caitlin
13
David
<12 mos

/OO

/87 (B)

/87 (B)

/87 (B)

0

07
E, P, P, D, E, N, N
no, mom, dada, what's that, boo, ball, balloon

American

08
P, P, A ,N ,A ,E ,E , P
mamma, daddy, pretty, truck, oh scary, oh boy,
oh wow, gramma

0
American

08
N, N, N, N, E, N, I, P
ball, block, box, car, hi, kitty, quack, mama

00
American

09
P, P, E, E, E, N, A, N, N
mama, dad, bye-bye, peekaboo, no, kitty, nummy,
puppy, bottle

11

00
American

09
P, A, E, P, P, E, A, A, A
hi Sara, hot, bye-bye, mama, dad, hi, all gone, all
done, bad

Miranda
>12 mos

01

American

10
P, P, N, P, E, N, N, D, P, N
dad, momma, duck, lady, hi, book, ball, that,
grandpa, blanky

James
15<20

English

P, V, I, D, I, I, E, N, N, V
mummy, go, quack, there, buzz, moo, boo, teddy,
ball, more

Jacqui

0

10

15<20

English

wee, hello, mummy, here, no, down, more, go,
Jacqui, bee

Jenny
15<20

0

10
1, E, D, N, N, I, N, N, P, E
choo-choo, bye-bye, there, teddy doggy, moo, shoe,
car, mummy, no

Timmy
Skyleigh
11

2/14/01

07
E, V, V,N, V,P,P
alio (hello), donne (give), tiens (take it), eau (water),
encore (more), papa, mama

American

11

2/14/01

0
French

Bailey

01

10

English
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V, E, P, D, E, V, V, V, P, N

Date Collected Child's Name # Siblings
and age in mo. Nationality

Words

/87 (B)

10
D, E, D, E, N, N, I, I, N, E
there, hello, here, bye-bye, teddy, shoes, vroom,
woof, baby, yes

Categories

Madeleine
15<20

0

Jay
15

01

American

2/15/01

Cameron
16

00
American

13
E, E, P, P, N, P, E, P, I, I, E, E, V
scuse me, thank you, mom, dad, kitty, Nanna, please.
Clay, moo, bark, wow, uh-oh, smile

2/15/01

Jared
15

02
American

14
P, P, N, N, E, E, P, N, N, P, P, N, N, E
mommy, daddy, fruitroll, juice, owie, no no, Shesha,
puppy, teddy bear, Nanny, Pappa, kitty, fruits, please

/93(V)

Laurent
14

0

/99 (BB)

Marie
17

0
French

V, N, N, V, A, A, P, N, P, N, P, P, E, P, P,
P, N,N
attends (wait), bateau (boat), bebe (baby), dodo
(sleep), c'est beau (it's nice), c'est beau ca (that's
nice), Jacquot, poupee (doll), Tintin, tartine (toast),
Ludovic, papa, non, Nono, mama, Mimi chat,
papillon (butterfly), voiture (car)

/92 (V)

Deborah
13

0
American

19

N, N, P, N, N, N, E, V, E, E, E, I, E, V, P,
N, I, P, E
baby, ball, daddy, duck, bird, book, byebye, rowrow,
patty-cake. Sesame Street, shoe, meow, ah, hi, uh-oh,
mama, woof-woof, yay, no

2/19/01

Macy
16

00
American

19

/79

English

French

10
E , E , E , E , E , N , N ,V , P ,N
hi, hello, wow, uh-oh, thank you, shoe, socks, drink,
daddy, bus

18

N, N, N, E, P, P, A, I, N, N, V, E, I, E, D,
N, D, A
bebe (baby), bouton (button), cocotte (hen), coucou
(peek-a-boo), Koki, mama, miam (yum), ouah-ouah
(bowwow), petits trous (little holes), banane
(banana), donne (give), non (no), vroom, alio (hello),
voila (here), balle (ball), pas la (not there), parti
(gone)
18

N, N, N, P, P, P, N, N, E, E, V, V, V, V, E,
E, E, N, N
puppy, ducky, pepsi, dada, mama, Kudro, cow, truck,
no, yes, go, see, pee, poop, shit, ouch, owie, nose,
belly button
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Date Collected Child's Name # Siblings
and age in mo. Nationality

Words

2/19/01

19

Degan

01

21

American

Categories

P, P, N, P, P, E, E, A,V, N, A, N, E, P,N, E,
V,N,P
mommy, daddy, doggy, Papa, Nana, no, yeah,
yum yum, more, bubble, yellow, bear, uh-oh. Bob,
eye, ow, out, duck, Poo

/92 (V)
14

Alice
English

2/15/01
16

Grace
American

/89(V)
13

Molly
American

I, I, N, N, A, N, A, V, A, V, N, V, N, P, I, I,
E, E, A, A, V
bang, burp, cat, dog, good girl, horse, hot, peek,
round, squeek, teeth, up, baby, daddy, ho-ho-ho,
moo, night-night, no-no, one-two-three, pretty, rockie

/92(V)
14

Charles
French

22

A, A, N, N, E, V, I, N, P, D, N, D, E, V, N,
N, E, N, N, P, V, E
bah (yuck), beau (beautiful), bebe (baby), poupee
(doll), bravo, boire (drink), boom, lapin (rabbit), pap,
ca (that), gateau (cake), tiens (here), asis (seated),
chaussures (shoes), chaussettes (socks), ours (bear),
alio (hello), canard (duck), mama, myam (eat/yum),
non (no)

/99 (BB)
17

Leo
French

23

2/17/01
23

Bradley
American

20

E, N, E, A, E, N, N, N, N, P, N, N, P, N, P
E, N, P, P, E
bye, eye, hi, clean, whee, bear, nam, baby, blanket,
Bonnie, bottle, bunny, daddy, dolly, emie, hiya, lady,
mommy, Oscar, thank you
00

20

P, P, E, N, V, V, V, E, E, E, P, P, I, I,
V, D, D, N, N, P
mom, dad, no, pop, don't, don't be mean, shut up, hi,
yes, papa, grandma, woof woof, meow, come on,
where is he, what's that, baby, ball, Poo
21

E, V, N, P, P, D, N, E, P, N, V, N, P, A, N,
E, D, N, N, N, N, D, N
alio (hello), donne (give), de l'eau (some water),
papa, mama, la (there), bebe-poupee (babydoll),
coucou (peek-a-boo), Koko, bouton (button), manger
(eat), ballon (ball), Didier, pas la, parti (not there,
gone), petits trous (little holes), non non non (no no
no), voila (there it is), cuillerre (spoon), brosse
(brush), canard (duck), chapeau (hat), la la dame la
(there the lady there), canard dans I'eau (duck in the
water)

00

24

N, N, P, P, V, V, N, E, E, V, V, E, N, N, P,
P, P, P, E, E, V, V, A, A
toys, cow, mommy, daddy, poo poo, pee pee, shoes,
uh-uh, thank you, nap, hurt, owie, hair, blanky,
poppa, mamma, Hugh, Bradley, no, yes, jump, eat,
thirsty, yummy
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Date Collected Child's Name # Siblings
and age in mo. Nationality

Words

/92 (V)
16

Timmy
American

0

27

2/15/01
20

Selena
American

01

32

192 (W)
16

Alice
English

2/14/01

Rachel
18

Categories

I, N, N, E, K N, N, N, P, N, I, N, N, N, N,
N, N, N, N, N, E, P, P, P, P, N,N
baa, ball, bird, bye, cup, girl, kitty, flower, Ruth, eye,
moo, moon, nose, baby, bracelet, block, peg, balloon,
car, fire, hiya, mummy, Simon, Nana, daddy, eye,
fish
E, E, P, P, P, V, P, E, V, V, V, E, E, E, P, P,
N, E, N, V, V, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, I,
I
no, bye, mom, papa. Grandma, eat, sister, nite-nite,
peepee, poopoo, go away, excuse me, please, thank
you, Bamy, Poo, teeth, yes, snow, down, bath, shoes,
juice, cup, bottle, cheese, blanky, book, TV, phone,
caw-caw, duck-duck
35

E, N, E, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, A, P,
N, N, N, N, N, A, N, N, N, N, E, N, N, V, N,
E, P, P, V, A
bang, belly, bye, egg, eye, key, meat, plate, shoe, tea,
baby, bottle, bunny, clean, dady, elephant, iron,
flowers, lady, mommy, shiny, apple, duck, man,
milk, no, nose, blanket, down, hat, hello, Oscar,
grandpa, up, yum
00
American

44

P, P, P, P, P, P, P, P, P, P, P, P, N, E, N, N,
P, P, P, P, E, N, A, A, P, A, A, A, N, N, N,
N, V, E, E, E, N, N, V, P, P, P, A, V
mommy, daddy. Grandma, Grandpa, Curtis, Amanda,
Randy, Spud, Cami, Chuck, Manners, Jason, fish,
come on, puppy, kitty, Amie, Tony, Sarah, Mary, no,
bath, blue, magenta, Scooby-do, yucky, ick, hungry,
cup, baby, diper, wipes, kiss, bye-bye, hi, hello, toes,
mouth, drink, Steve, Nessa, Tama, hot, up
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